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ABSTRACT
Over the past three decades, government regulation and funding of DNA testing has
reshaped the use of genetic evidence across various fields, including criminal law, family law,
and employment law. Courts have struggled with questions of when and whether to treat genetic
evidence as implicating individual rights, policy trade-offs, or federalism problems. We identify
two modes of genetic testing: identification testing, used to establish a person’s identity, and
predictive testing, which seeks to predict outcomes for a person. Judges and lawmakers have often
drawn a bright line at predictive testing, while allowing uninhibited identification testing. The
U.S. Supreme Court in Maryland v. King, for example, held that entering arrestee DNA in
databanks does not implicate substantial Fourth Amendment concerns, since police do not test for
genetic predispositions “not relevant to identity.” We argue that policy implications of genetic
testing laws cannot be so neatly demarcated. For example, federal welfare laws require states to
use DNA to establish paternity to collect child support from “deadbeat dads,” which may be
relevant to identity, but also creates potentially destabilizing effects on families. We explore how
genetic testing has been regulated across a variety of fields. We identify two dominant modes of
regulatory action dealing with genetics: data-driven and ethics-based. Data-driven legislation is
ostensibly focused on short-term benefits of gathering a population’s genetic information. Ethicsbased legislation, in contrast, is concerned with long-term consequences, such as effects on privacy. We particularly critique data-driven legislation, and we argue that judges, legislators, and
scholars should focus squarely on the individual and government interests at stake. We set out a
list of five factors that legal actors should consider when considering genetics regulation: (1)
equality, (2) accuracy, (3) privacy, (4) finality, and (5) federalism. In particular, equality
concerns permeate the short history of DNA regulation. In each of the areas explored, compara© 2016 Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett. Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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tively disadvantaged groups such as arrestees, convicts, juveniles, noncitizens, and welfare recipients have received the most intrusive regulation and collection of their genetic evidence, while
comparatively privileged persons benefit from enhanced genetic privacy. We conclude that the
regulation of genetic evidence deserves far more careful legal scrutiny, since the ways that genetic
evidence is deployed can profoundly affect constitutional rights and the structure of legal and
social institutions.

INTRODUCTION
DNA testing, widely available for over twenty-five years, has revolutionized the way local, state, and federal governments understand identity by
making it inexpensive to obtain a person’s genetic profile and link people to
biological evidence and to each other. With the benefit of different types of
DNA testing, the state can now say with greater certainty whether a particular
suspect was the culprit of a crime or whether a particular person is the biological parent of a child. DNA testing has been embraced with enthusiasm by
courts, legislatures, and agencies, state and federal, across areas of law ranging from criminal law, employment law, family law, and health law because it
is easy to obtain and offers apparent certainty. This Article critically assesses
these developments, focusing on the seemingly unobtrusive collection of
genetic data, and argues that heightened legal scrutiny of genetic regulation
is needed.
As with any new technology, genetic testing has captured the imagination of scholars. Early on, some scholars predicted that genetic tests would
supplant traditional legal tests. Many legal standards, particularly constitutional tests, are broad and vague, while DNA tests have the appealing ability
to seemingly make evidentiary determinations certain. In 1992, Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss and Dorothy Nelkin called the trend to reduce questions to
genetics “genetics essentialism.”1 More recently, scholars have asked whether
there is a “genetics exceptionalism” in which policymakers over-privilege the
importance or uses of genetic evidence.2 Still others have predicted that

1 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 313, 316 (1992) (“[T]he trend toward what we will call ‘genetic essentialism’
deserves more study than it has received so far. . . .”); see also DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN
LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON 41 (1995); Mary R. Anderlik &
Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda,
28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 217–18 (2002) (outlining the social impact of federal welfare
policy on DNA-based identity testing).
2 See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need
Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 674 (2001); see also generally Lawrence O.
Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism,
40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999); Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 77 (2003); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 27, 27–33 (2005).
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DNA testing will reinvigorate the eugenics movement, as imagined in films
such as Gattaca.3
“Genetic testing,” however, is not a legal subject. As many scholars have
observed about other new areas of law, such as “cyberlaw,” the law of genetic
testing is a version of “the law of the horse.”4 It is not a unified field but the
analysis of a particular technology in relation to a cluster of existing legal
fields. DNA testing has not led to universal genetics essentialism, genetics
exceptionalism, or a new eugenics; instead, its uses have been inconsistent
and variable depending on the social and legal context in which DNA testing
is adopted. Rather than a story of genetics overtaking the law and rendering
complex legal questions deceptively simple, DNA testing has itself been
caught up in preexisting regulatory relationships between federal and state
and local governments, privacy advocates and scientific researchers, law
enforcement and social services, each with competing goals. And, as Gaia
Bernstein has astutely observed, “technological innovation can both create
and bring to the forefront legal values that for years lurked in the shadows of
legal discourse.”5
These preexisting regulatory contexts often result in legal structures that
reflect the concerns and perspectives of elites at the expense of other members of the political community. The amount of attention given to genetic
privacy, we argue, depends in large part on the context in which a genetic
regulation is initially conceived. Equality concerns permeate the short history of DNA regulation. In each of the areas we explore in this Article, comparatively disadvantaged groups such as arrestees, convicts, juveniles,
noncitizens, and welfare recipients, have received the most intrusive regulation and collection of their genetic evidence. In contrast, more privileged
persons are not subjected to government DNA collection and may instead
benefit from legislation protecting their genetic privacy.
As John Hart Ely famously argued in his classic book, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, the legislative process, through its enactment
of the majority will, can lead to discrimination against the politically powerless and block the channels of political change.6 According to Ely, when
courts attempt to intervene, they often mistake specific problems “as isolated
pockets of concern,” slotting them into “familiar pigeonholes.”7 These seemingly separate issues, however, may form a “unity,” or a larger problem in
3 GATTACA (Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. 1997); see also, e.g., Lisa Schriner Lewis,
Note, The Role Genetic Information Plays in the Criminal Justice System, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 519
(2005).
4 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 208; Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 243 (describing how new legal
problems arise in new technological contexts).
5 Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing and
the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965, 966 (2004).
6 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 172
(1980).
7 Id. at 177.
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which “uncontrollable discretion” risks harm to undervalued individual and
minority rights.8
Such, we argue, is the story of genetic regulation. Just as Professor Ely
observed of the death penalty that “the system is constructed so that ‘people
like us’ run no realistic risk of such punishment,”9 in genetic regulation, legislatures and judges have been far more careful and forward-thinking in
instances where they, or people of their social class, are likely to be subject to
regulation. This has led to some “pigeonholes” of genetic regulation being
treated very differently from others.
Consider, for example, a case decided using the “pigeonhole” of Fourth
Amendment privacy rights in criminal law. In Maryland v. King, the U.S.
Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether taking and analyzing
a cheek swab of an arrestee’s DNA is “like fingerprinting and photographing,
a legitimate police booking procedure.”10 In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy concluded that it was constitutionally reasonable for the state to
take DNA evidence because of the “negligible” physical intrusion and the
limited use of determining whether the individual was associated with the
crime scene or victim.11 A DNA test, according to the Court, was simply not
very different from a fingerprint or a photograph. The Court understood
the issue to be simple expansion of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, not a
new foray into issues of genetic privacy.
Even the majority opinion, however, revealed, perhaps unintentionally,
that cabining off DNA evidence into the criminal law pigeonhole might not
be as simple as it sounds. Although the opinion emphasized how current
DNA testing of arrestees examines “noncoding parts of the DNA that do not
reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee,” it also acknowledged that “science
can always progress further, and those progressions may have Fourth Amendment consequences,” particularly if they seek to determine “an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to
identity.”12 This application of DNA testing may not be so different from
predicting future behavior or outcomes, when DNA databases are used both
in the present, but also to potentially link a person to future crimes.13 The
line between identification testing and predictive testing is not always so
clear.
Federal lawmakers clearly believe such bright lines can be drawn. For
example, Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 (GINA), which prohibits changing the terms of health insurance coverage based on genetic information and forbids employment discrimination
8 Id.
9 Id. at 173.
10 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
11 See id. at 1969.
12 Id. at 1979.
13 For a wonderful exploration of the complex privacy and equality issues that DNA
databanks pose, see ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA
138–241 (2015).
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based on genetic information.14 As one federal court has put it, “[t]he basic
intent of GINA is to prohibit employers from making a ‘predictive assessment
concerning an individual’s propensity to get an inheritable genetic disease or
disorder based on the occurrence of an inheritable disease or disorder in [a]
family member.’ ”15 In contrast, few such privacy protections exist in the welfare context, in which Congress encourages states to conduct potentially
intrusive paternity testing to promote child support collection.16
We argue that drawing a bright line between uses of genetics to identify
and to predict is, at best, useful only as a starting place for judges, legislators,
and policymakers. A court should not find a use of genetics “not relevant to
identity,” and stop there, as the Supreme Court largely did in King. In this
Article, we examine whether a clearer and more consistent framework for
answering such questions is possible or desirable. Our framework makes the
political process problems in current DNA regulation transparent and provides guidance to inform judicial review to intervene where important political constituencies are unrepresented.
This Article takes a broad look at how DNA has altered the legal landscape by canvasing several disparate areas to identify common themes and
common questions.17 We analyze how legislatures have approached genetic
testing, and use our analysis of these approaches to introduce new typologies
that will help categorize and illuminate the regulatory choices genetic testing
invites. In particular, we identify two modes of genetic testing: identification
testing, which focuses on establishing a person’s identity, and predictive testing, which focuses on predicting outcomes for a person based on his or her
genetic code. These two forms of testing have tended to result in different
modes of regulation.
Next, we identify the two dominant modes of regulatory action in the
genetics arena: data-driven and ethics-based. By “regulation,” we broadly
refer to legal uses of genetic information, not only regulations promulgated
by administrative agencies, but also statutes enacted by legislatures, as well as
judicial decisions and the exercise of executive discretion.
In general, we argue, data-driven regulation tends to concentrate on the
short-term benefits of developing comprehensive information about a population’s genetic information; ethics-based regulation, in contrast, is centrally
concerned with the long-term consequences of using DNA, such as its effects
on privacy or individual rights. In addition, data-driven regulation is often
enacted or approved of with little or no discussion of its effect on genetic
privacy; instead, the focus is often on some other, more immediate legislative
14 See generally Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L.
No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
15 Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d 727, 730 (W.D. Va. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 3, at 70 (2007), as reprinted in 2008
U.S.C.C.A.N. 112, 141).
16 See infra Section II.C.
17 For a recent article exploring genetic-privacy rights through a property law lens, see
Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2015).
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goal, such as collecting child support payments or solving a crime. Ethicsbased regulation, in contrast, tends to be made with great deliberation and
with an understanding that individuals have an interest in their own genetic
privacy.
We argue that where a particular approach to DNA testing falls within
this schema depends in large part on the area of law at issue, the political
power of the constituents likely to be affected by the law, and the legal and
social context in which the regulation arises. Data-driven approaches, we
find, are more likely than ethics-based approaches to reflect a flaw in the
political process that makes the population most affected by the regulation
the least heard. In addition, we find a strong correlation between identification testing and data-driven regulation, and a similar connection between
predictive testing and ethics-based regulation. This connection, at least so
far, is likely the result of whether a crisis exists at the time a law is passed.
Data-driven laws are often passed in response to a perceived emergency—the
threat of millions of “deadbeat dads” failing to pay child support or a particular rape or murder that could have been solved had the perpetrator’s DNA
been available in a databank, for example. But, we argue, as time goes on,
there is a danger that the rules applied to identification testing may be
expanded to cover predictive testing, and these rules, depending on the legal
“pigeonhole” in which they originated, may offer little or no protection to
individual genetic privacy.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we introduce the typology
described above, first by describing the different types of DNA testing that
can be conducted currently, both to identify personal genetic data and to
predict outcomes, and then introducing how identity is litigated in different
legal settings resulting in policy choices that may or may not directly regulate
genetic evidence directly or intentionally. We suggest that one must ask (1)
whether genetic regulation is predictive or for purposes of identity and (2)
whether the regulation is data-driven or ethics-based regulation.
In Part II, we contrast genetic regulation in three fields: (1) employment
and health law, where with the passage of GINA, Congress focused on direct
regulation of genetics with a focus on ethics concerns; (2) criminal law, in
which the Supreme Court has ratified the data-driven and direct regulation
of genetics, through a federal project of assembling a vast national DNA
databank, but in which legislators, law enforcement, and the Court have
adopted a hands-off approach towards questions of ethics, neglecting privacy
questions and reluctantly permitting DNA testing that might free the innocent; and (3) family law, in which the federal government has required states
to focus on establishing paternity, incidentally regulating genetic evidence as
part of accomplishing that data-driven concern, and to the exclusion of other
important ethical concerns of real importance to state actors.
Part III considers the commonalities of these areas. When legal actors
focus on collection of genetics data, they may do so directly and assess
whether there are ethical concerns with doing so; we view that as preferable
to indirectly regulating genetics while treating ethical concerns as not impli-
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cated. We set out a list of five factors that legal actors should consider when
examining genetics regulation: (1) equality, (2) accuracy, (3) privacy, (4)
finality, and (5) federalism. We conclude by considering what the inconsistencies in regulating genetics suggest about our commitments to using information about genetic identity to regulate. We argue that far more legal and
policy scrutiny is required to justify broad government collection and testing
of genetic evidence.
I. DNA TESTING, IDENTITY,

AND

REGULATION

DNA testing, like blood-typing, fingerprinting, or any other means of
biometric identification, is a scientific method for identifying personal characteristics of a living being. Unlike some of these earlier forms of biological
testing, however, DNA testing provides the opportunity to both identify a
particular person with near certainty and to predict characteristics as well as
propensities that may be associated with that person’s genetic makeup. The
nuclear DNA of a person contains twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, and
that DNA sequence is found in almost all of our cells. That nuclear DNA
contains genes that provide important instructions for the functioning of
each cell, but it acts along with other proteins, enzymes and ribonucleic acid
(RNA), in complex ways that are still being studied. This genetic code can be
used for many purposes. It can, for example, constitute proof that a particular person’s genetic material was deposited, through blood, semen, or hair,
in a particular place.
Genetic information is also shared; one’s genetics are inherited from
one’s biological parents.18 Therefore, genetic tests can show that a particular
person is related to another and even provide proof of ancestry, as the
descendants of Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings have discovered.19
DNA can also be used to show propensities—a propensity to have a particular
kind of cancer or perhaps even a propensity to commit a crime. Test results
may be relevant not just to an individual, but also important to other blood
relatives, if the tests indicate that a person inherited a genetic condition.
Standing alone, a DNA test may mean little. Scientific data require interpretation to be understood, and not just by the laboratory analyst that conducts the testing and reports the results, but by medical, legal, or government
actors that seek to use that information. Perhaps even more importantly,
scientific data, like any form of evidence, require that the actors using that
data have a theory of why the data are probative. But in order to understand
the limitations of and interpretative choices inherent in the use of DNA, we
must first understand, in its basic outlines, the current science of DNA
testing.
18 For an exploration of the legal implications of the shared nature of genetic material, see id.
19 See, e.g., FRONTLINE, Jefferson’s Blood: Is It True?, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jefferson/true/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
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These results have occurred because DNA tests are meaningless without
interpretation. The interpreters of DNA’s meaning—forensic analysts,
judges, legislatures, prosecutors, police, and parents—are embedded within
existing legal institutions with various regulatory goals and purposes. As Dorothy Roberts has put it well: “There is nothing either precious or sinister
about the genetic tie by itself. The genetic tie’s precise social import
depends on the type of relationship to which it becomes relevant and the
prevalent social conditions that influence that relationship.”20 The availability of DNA has shaped these legal institutions, which simultaneously shape
how DNA evidence is used and is itself regulated.
This feedback loop means that the interaction between DNA and legal
change has differed markedly across various contexts. For example, in contrast to the narrow focus in Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA testing in
criminal cases, in a family law case in which a putative father also brought a
Fourth Amendment challenge to a DNA test, a federal judge emphasized
broader policy concerns in finding: “DNA testing for paternity is not unreasonably invasive in light of the compelling state interest to protect the welfare
of children.”21
A. Types of DNA Testing
There is not just one type of DNA test. There are many forms of genetic
testing that examine different portions of the genetic sequence, making different comparisons, and for different reasons. Two general types of DNA
tests, broadly speaking, are designed to identify specific individuals, as
opposed to those designed to test for other genetic information, such as
hereditary diseases or other health risks.
1. Identification Testing
In criminal cases, DNA tests are (currently) of the first type, used to try
to identify individuals. The purpose of such DNA tests is to identify a culprit
by comparing a person’s genetic material to trace evidence left at a crime
scene. DNA material can remain intact for years or even decades in good
conditions or if samples are stored properly, but humidity and exposure to
bacteria, heat, or chemicals can cause DNA to degrade quickly. Most criminal cases do not have biological material left at a crime scene by a perpetrator; such testing is particularly useful in sexual assault cases or in cases where
the culprit left a piece of clothing or was known to have touched an object.
Before DNA testing became common, ABO blood typing could sometimes be
done in criminal cases, and it could readily exclude a suspect; however, since
large portions of the population share each of the four blood types, it was not
20 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 211 (1995).
21 Allen v. Howard, No. 13–233, 2014 WL 2120092, at *4 (E.D. La. May 21, 2014).
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very probative evidence that a person had the same type as evidence tested
from a crime scene.22
DNA testing can provide highly probative evidence when there is relevant material that can be tested. While nuclear DNA contains many genes
that do important work providing instructions for how to encode proteins,
there are “noncoding” regions of the genetic sequence; in fact the vast majority of the sequences is non-coding, sometimes called “junk DNA,” and at minimum, its purpose is not known.23 In the 1980s, geneticists identified
particular noncoding regions of the DNA sequence that vary a great deal
from person to person; the more variable the region of the DNA is the more
useful it is to differentiate between people. In certain portions, there are
quite variable repetitive sequences in which the same pattern of alleles
(sequences of DNA at a particular position or locus) is repeated over and
over.24 Beginning in the 1980s, scientists developed techniques to isolate
those repetitive alleles or regions of the DNA strand. Early Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) testing required a large quantity of nondegraded genetic material, and interpretation of the results was potentially
subjective.25
By the mid-1990s, however, Short Tandem Repeat (STR) testing could
be conducted, and unlike RFLP testing, it can be performed on very small
samples. During the 1990s, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods permitted scientists to amplify small samples for STR analysis by making billions
of copies of the sample, and then new capillary electrophoresis technology
permitted rapid and largely computerized analysis of genetic material
extracted from samples.26 Those tests are now standardized, and in the
United States, analysts now compare thirteen loci, or portions of a person’s
genome, and examine the number of repetitions of particular alleles at each
loci (soon to be expanded to include twenty loci).27 A person’s DNA profile,
as used in a criminal case, consists of thirteen pairs of numbers (one for each
chromosome), with each number representing the number of “repeats” at
each loci.
The results of that DNA testing do not provide a “match,” even if all
thirteen pairs consist in the same numbers, but rather a probability that
22 For a description of the uses of ABO blood enzyme group typing and its limitations,
see Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2009).
23 For excellent descriptions, see SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE 7–8 (2011), and MURPHY, supra note 13, at 3–17.
24 See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS
OF STR MARKERS 22–23 (2d ed. 2005).
25 See id. at 146.
26 See id. at 12, 146.
27 Short Tandem Repeats (STRs), DNA DIAGNOSTICS CTR., http://www.forensicdna
center.com/dna-str.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015); see also Notice of Release of the 2015 FBI
Population Data for the Expanded CODIS Core STR Loci, FBI.GOV, https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/expanded-fbi-str-2015-final-6-16-15.pdf (last visited Dec.
4, 2015).
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genetic material could be expected to randomly match. Using population
statistics, scientists can determine whether one person in many millions, or
even billions or trillions could be expected to randomly match a particular
DNA profile. One area of regulation, or lack thereof, lies simply with the
calculation of those population statistics. In criminal cases at least, analysts
rely on allelic tables prepared by the FBI. The FBI has been unwilling to
share the underlying population data with researchers, who have criticized
this unwillingness, and in 2015, it emerged that there were a series of errors
in those tables, and those errors have resulted in thousands of notifications
being sent about criminal cases in which the calculations may have been
erroneous.28
Other DNA tests sometimes used in criminal cases are less probative;
DNA testing can be done on the Y chromosome (Y-STR testing), but all members of a paternal lineage would share the same results, and mitochondrial
DNA tests, useful when hairs are found at a crime scene, also provide weaker
findings since mitochondrial DNA is matrilineally inherited.29
In family law, DNA tests are also of the first broad type and are used to
identify individuals, but specifically to examine whether they have a familial
relationship with each other. Genetic testing is typically performed using different types of DNA tests that involve a far wider array of genetic markers
than the thirteen loci used in criminal cases, comparing the DNA profile of a
child with that of the possible parent, with results that are 99.99% accurate.30
A paternity test, for example, can cost as little as a few hundred dollars and as
much as two thousand dollars and can be conducted prenatally (with lower
cost “curiosity testing” and various companies offering tests for under
$100).31
28 See Megan Cassidy, Crime-Scene DNA Errors Spark Complex Legal Questions, ARIZ. REPUB(June 22, 2015), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2015/06/22/
crime-scene-dna-errors-spark-complex-legal-questions/29095963/ (describing that of over
1,000 cases used to calculate the FBI allelic frequently tables, thirty-three cases had errors,
to which the FBI commented, “[w]e are of the view that these discrepancies are unlikely to
materially affect any assessment of evidential value”).
29 See BUTLER, supra note 24, at 213–14, 241; see also David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the
Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 797, 806 (2007).
30 For example, the SNP (single-nucleotide polymorphism) Microarray Technology
examines 317,000 genetic markers, and LabCorp uses 21 markers. See Press Release, Lab.
Corp. of Am., LabCorp Is the First National Laboratory to Offer Customers a 21-Marker
Genetic Analysis in Combination with a Double-Blind Process on Every Sample for Parentage/Relationship Testing (Mar. 26, 2010), https://www.labcorp.com/wps/wcm/connect/
4f28db8041ecc8aca47ee5552702868a/Promega+Press+Release+03-26-10+Final.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES&CACHEID=4f28db8041ecc8aca47ee5552702868a&CACHEID=caceff8041e4620
cac73ec91f7118b4f&CACHEID=caceff8041e4620cac73ec91f7118b4f; Most Significant Innovation in Paternity Testing in the Last Decade, DNA DIAGNOSTICS CTR. (Aug. 16, 2011), http://
www.dnacenter.com/media/prenatal-paternity-test-using-SNP.html.
31 See, e.g., Paternity Testing, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://americanpregnancy.org/
prenataltesting/paternitytesting.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
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In both family law and criminal law, the goal is to identify a person using
a genetic test. DNA testing was not such a fundamentally new technology
that the law had to radically shift to take account of it. Less precise blood
typing could be used in the past, and in criminal cases, there may be a wide
range of evidence connecting a person to a crime; for example, many
criminals are caught in the act. In criminal law, identity matters in the sense
that in some criminal cases (though not crimes involving non-strangers),
there is a question who committed the crime. In family law, though, the
identity of a biological parent may be relevant information, but sometimes
the biological tie may not be so relevant after all, depending on, for example,
who has formed a relationship with the child, who has taken on child-care
obligations, whether there has been an adoption, and a range of other factors. The biological link standing alone is not at all dispositive as to child
custody, and therefore, the advent of more precise modern DNA testing
would not be expected to transform family law.
2. Predictive Testing
A second broad category of genetic testing examines a person’s DNA,
not to identify that person, but in order make predictions about the person’s
likely health or medical predispositions or risks, drug sensitivity, or perhaps
even the person’s future behavior.32 The term phenotyping refers to the identification of characteristics of a person that can be observed as having derived
from their genetic traits, in interaction with the environment. Our focus in
this Article is on genetic identity used to identify the relevant person and not
in the sense of identifying a person’s phenotype or genetic characteristics.
Some of those genetic characteristics may be readily identifiable. For example, all fifty states require genetic testing for newborn infants, using DNA,
protein, or metabolite analyses to screen for genetic disorders such as hypothyroidism, phenylketonuria (PKU), and sickle-cell anemia.33 These tests are
conducted on blood samples in order to identify and treat conditions early
on. Legal challenges regarding the collection, storage, and retention of
these blood samples have been rejected, although the Minnesota Supreme
Court found consent must be obtained to use those samples for research.34
There are currently genetic tests available for over 1,000 different diseases, but as National Institute of Health Director Francis Collins puts it well,
“the field is moving so quickly that any genetic risk predictions based on
today’s understanding will need to be revised in the context of new discoveries tomorrow.”35 Of course, family health history has long been used to
assess risk factors for a range of medical conditions. Given the increasingly
32 For an excellent overview, see FRANCIS COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND
REVOLUTION IN PERSONALISED MEDICINE (2010).
33 Colin McFerrin, Note, DNA, Genetic Material, and a Look at Property Rights: Why You
May Be Your Brother’s Keeper, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 967, 976–978 (2013); see also, e.g.,
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33.011 (West 2015).
34 See Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 774 (Minn. 2011).
35 COLLINS, supra note 32, at xxii.
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low cost of genetic testing, more sophisticated efforts to engage in “personalized medicine,” both to predict and treat conditions, are increasingly possible.36 However, for a wide range of common medical conditions and
behavioral diagnoses, genetics may play a part, but so may environmental
factors, and the precise role of genetics is the subject of intensive research.37
B. Regulation of Genetics
Identification and predictive testing have been treated quite differently
by the law. In addition to the distinction between identification and predictive uses of DNA, we will also explore an important distinction in how legislatures operate when they are regulating genetic testing. Sometimes, a
legislature is intensely concerned with the morality and long-term consequences of using genetic information. We call this “ethics-based regulation.”
By ethics, we broadly refer to a family of normative, moral, and individualrights concerns, including privacy, equality, family and child welfare, dignity,
and procedural due process concerns. Such ethical concerns have prevailed,
we argue, where the long-term consequences are likely to be visited on wide
swaths of population across socio-economic groups. Predictive uses of genetics may also make ethical issues salient, although we do not at all view it as
necessarily the case that identity-focused uses raise fewer ethical concerns. In
contrast, legislatures sometimes act in what we call a “data-driven” fashion.
In data-driven regulation, the primary goal is the collection of genetic information to identify and track individuals. This form of regulation tends to be
more concerned about short-term gains (often political ones) without attending to the long-term ethical problems that might arise. Data-driven regulation also tends to focus more on genetic identity, a narrower band of
information about a person, than it does other types of genetic information.
In the long run, data-driven efforts can lead unintentionally to breaches of
privacy when information intended for one purpose is mined for another.
Because data-driven regulation often bypasses ethical issues, it often disproportionately affects those who do not have political capital or an adequate
voice in the conversation at the outset.
In fact, data-driven regulation can often be incidental, in that lawmakers
or policymakers may not even be aware that they are regulating genetics.
Instead, they think they are regulating something else—welfare law, for
example, or immigration law.38 In these instances, genetic information is
one piece of a larger legislative goal lawmakers assume that a genetic tie
stands in for another kind of relationship, for example, that a genetic father
should automatically be a legal father, or a genetic parent should automati36 See id.
37 See Paul S. Appelbaum & Nicholas Scurich, Impact of Behavioral Genetic Evidence on the
Adjudication of Criminal Behavior, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 91, 91 (2014) (describing
link between a specific gene variant and criminal behavior); infra Part III.
38 For a critique of immigration judges’ use of state family law, see Kari E. Hong,
Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Immigration Courts, and Derivative Citizenship, 28 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 277 (2014).
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cally confer citizenship on her foreign-born child. Here, the problem is less
the long-term consequences of data-gathering (although it can be) but
rather that the initial, unintentional genetics legislation skips the important
step of thoughtfully considering what it means to be engaged in genetics
regulation. As with data-driven regulation generally, incidental regulation
can also have the drawback of further disadvantaging the already
disadvantaged.
II. COMPARING APPROACHES TOWARDS GENETIC IDENTITY
We will now take a close look at the path of genetic regulation in three
areas in which the law has responded to genetic testing: (1) health and
employment law, (2) criminal law, and (3) family law. In each area, as noted,
DNA tests have been used in multiple ways to predict health issues or establish identity, and DNA tests have also been sidelined or discouraged by regulation in important ways. Each area provides a set of important lessons about
the interaction between genetic technology, evidence law, institutional interests, policy, and regulation.
A. Predictive Testing: Regulating Genetics in Health and Employment Law
Predictive genetic testing is useful for assisting individuals and their
health providers in preventive care. It is also widely used to assist future parents in deciding whether to conceive and whether to carry a pregnancy to
term. Predictive genetic testing has other potential uses—particularly, in the
criminal law area, for predicting propensities to commit crimes—but so far,
the areas of law in which it has been heavily regulated have been primarily
health- and employment-related.
The primary concerns of these laws are privacy and discrimination. If
the government, private insurer, or employer knows that an individual carries
a gene that makes them more likely to suffer from a particular disability or
disease, that entity might not want to provide health coverage or employ that
particular individual. In 1996, Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).39 Although the better-known provisions of HIPAA concern protections for patient privacy and the ability of
employees to take their insurance with them when they switch jobs, HIPAA
also prohibits employer-sponsored health insurance from establishing eligibility rules based on a person’s “genetic information.”40 More recently, Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA), which expanded the provisions of HIPAA to prohibit changing the
terms of health insurance coverage based on genetic information.41 And in
39 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C.).
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a)(6) (2012).
41 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 105,
122 Stat. 881, 903 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9).
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2011, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“PPACA,” “ACA,” or, more colloquially, “Obamacare”). This law prohibited
health insurers from denying insurance based on “pre-existing conditions.”42
Under GINA, an insurer could not deny coverage based on a genetic test but
could deny it based on an already expressed genetic disease. The ACA closed
that loophole.43
In passing GINA in 2008, Congress not only expanded anti-discrimination measures in health insurance coverage but also extended these protections to cover employment. GINA amended the federal employment
discrimination statutes by adding “genetic information” to the list of forbidden types of discrimination in employment.44 Employment decisions ranging from hiring, firing, layoffs, promotion, benefits, or any term or condition
of employment may not be made based on genetic information,45 harassment based on genetic information is prohibited,46 and an employer may not
retaliate against an employee who complains of such discrimination.47 Nor
can an employer request or obtain genetic information about employees,48
with some exceptions (including DNA testing for law enforcement purposes).49 Further, EEOC regulations make clear that employers cannot seek
genetic information from family members to, for example, find out about
their medical histories and propensity for particular diseases or disorders;
42 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2705(a), 124
Stat. 119, 156 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4).
43 See id.
44 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 201–13, 122 Stat. at 905–20.
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (“[It is unlawful] to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or otherwise to discriminate against any employee with respect to
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the employee,
because of genetic information with respect to the employee.”); id. § 2000ff(4) (defining
“genetic information”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(c) (2014) (defining “genetic
information”).
46 See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.4; see also Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 68912, 68918 (Nov. 9, 2010) (describing EEOC’s
interpretation of prohibited practices including a cognizable harassment claim under 29
C.F.R. § 1635.4).
47 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 207(f) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ff-6(f)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1635.7.
48 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 202(b) (making it unlawful for
employer “to request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an
employee or a family member of the employee”). “Genetic test” is defined as “an analysis
of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes,
mutations, or chromosomal changes.” Id. § 201(7)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(f) (containing a nearly identical definition of “genetic test” as 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(7)(A), but with a
slight difference in punctuation).
49 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 202(b)(6); see also Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6403(d), 118 Stat.
3638, 3759 (describing reporting requirements for the Attorney General for criminal history record checks).
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“family members” is defined broadly to include “persons related from the
first to the fourth degree of an individual.”50
An important goal of GINA was to prevent discrimination in employment decisions, as well as discrimination by healthcare providers and insurers
at the federal level, and to promote additional genetics research without individuals fearing that results of genetic tests might cause them to lose their
jobs.51 However, one central purpose of the law had nothing to do with
workplace privacy, but rather was to encourage people to get DNA testing to
identify medical conditions—and support research in genetics so that the
future role that genetics plays in certain medical conditions can be better
understood. The legislative findings noted that the law had the purpose to
“protect the public from discrimination” but also to “allay [the public’s] concerns about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to
take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.”52 Then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi commented that “[b]ecause of
this legislation, Americans will be free to undergo genetic testing for diseases
such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and Alzheimer’s, without fearing for
their job or health insurance.”53
Federal intervention in health- and employment-related genetic testing
is an excellent example of ethics-based regulation of predictive genetic testing; for that reason, scholars have cited to it as an example of “genetics
exceptionalism,” in which uses of genetics are treated as “special” despite
similar or even greater concerns with regulation of other types of medical
information.54
We categorize this regulation as ethics-based because of the strong concerns about ethical issues exhibited in the test and legislative history of the
law, including both privacy concerns and concerns about workplace discrimination. GINA in particular was the result of thirteen years of extensive advocacy by members of Congress who imagined a future world in which genetic
testing could be used for nefarious ends.55 The law was not passed, as so
many are, in response to a particular tragic event or out of fear of an immedi50 Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed.
Reg. 68912, 68915 (Nov. 9, 2010) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a)).
51 For additional discussion of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, see
infra Part III.
52 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 2(5) (codifying GINA’s findings).
53 Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi: “Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
Will Protect Americans from Misuse of Genetic Information” (May 1, 2008), http://
www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/pelosi-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-actwill-protect-americans-misuse-genetic-information/.
54 See Rothstein, supra note 2, at 27; see also Suter, supra note 2, at 671.
55 Its principal sponsor, Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-NY), was a microbiologist with a
Master’s Degree in Public Health. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 447 (2010) (citing
Jonathan D. Rockoff, Senate Protects Genetic Test Data, BALT. SUN (Apr. 25, 2008), http:/
/articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-04-25/news/0804250008_1_genetic-testing-genetic-infor
mation-genetic-alliance).
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ate threat.56 In fact, a common argument against GINA was that it was premature, since genetic discrimination was infrequent.57 That said, more
litigation under GINA may be coming. In 2015, in a case the district judge
dubbed the “mystery of the devious defecator,” a federal jury awarded over
two million dollars in a genetic discrimination case as compensation for the
claimed invasiveness of submitting to the cheek swabs demanded by an
employer seeking to conduct DNA tests on fecal matter left at a warehouse to
try to identify the person responsible.58 The case, however, addressed an
attempt to identify individuals, though, not to predict future medical
outcomes.
Why were lawmakers so focused on the unknown future when passing
GINA and other genetic-privacy legislation? The predictive nature of the
testing, bringing with it fears of eugenics, coupled with the intentional
nature of the discussion, appears to have led to an ethics-based analysis. Both
the predictive and intentional aspects of the inquiry were crucial. Predictive
testing—testing for propensities, not actual identity—is far more speculative
than identity testing.59 A person could carry a gene associated with developing a certain type of cancer, for example, but that gene might never express
itself. In contrast, a person whose DNA test demonstrates that his DNA
matches the biological material found at a crime scene or establishes paternity of a particular child is actually that person, not simply likely to be. Certainly, the legislators were more concerned with protecting the rights of the
56 Cf. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47,
49, and 50 U.S.C.) (passed in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks); Exec. Order
No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (presidential order to intern Japanese-Americans during World War II).
57 See Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
41, 45 (2013); see also Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with
Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1463–64 (2001) (“Few claims of such discrimination have in fact been systematically investigated, verified, or documented. . . . [T]o
the extent that employers have used genotypic evidence to screen out certain persons from
the workplace, we have no empirical evidence to indicate whether these acts of discrimination were ‘irrational’ in the sense of being unrelated to bona fide occupational criteria.”);
Henry T. Greely, Genotype Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2001) (“Genetic discrimination is a much greater threat in
people’s fears than it is in reality, today or in the foreseeable future, for both scientific and
social reasons.”).
58 See Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, No. 1:13-CV-2425-AT,
2015 WL 2058906, at *2, *7–8 (N.D. Ga. May 5, 2015); see also Daniel Wiessner, Georgia
Workers Win $2.2 Mln in ‘Devious Defectator’ Case, REUTERS (June 23, 2015), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/23/verdict-dna-defecator-idUSL1N0Z916520150623
(describing the same case).
59 For the argument that GINA does not prohibit use of “genetic information” by
employers to identify individuals, see David H. Kaye, GINA’s Genotypes, 108 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 51 (2010), http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol108/iss1/5/.
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person being tested than they are with identity testing. With predictive testing, then, the chances of being “wrong” seem much higher.60
The intentional nature of the discussion mattered, too. The legislators
debating GINA knew that they were legislating about genetics. Granted, the
legislation concerned health law and employment law, but legislators were
specifically focused on the effect genetic testing could have on individual
people and how the law could foster or deter scientific progress and how it
might lead to invasions of privacy and discrimination.
Taken together, these two factors leant themselves to an ethics-based
approach. Although many bioethics scholars might lament the degree to
which their work is undervalued, the attention to ethical concerns during the
passage of GINA is stunning when compared to what has happened in other
legislative debates discussed in this Article.61 Legislators and activists
brought up eugenics, especially Nazi-era racial eugenics, concerns about
human cloning, etc. Granted, some of this involved a lack of scientific or
ethical understanding—many members of Congress reportedly did not
understand the difference between genetic testing and human cloning—but
the concern with the long-term implications of legislation was there.62
In addition to the concern with eugenics, legislators were also concerned with the rights of the disabled. This concern has also been the focus
in debates over prenatal genetic testing.63 If anything, the leading criticism
of GINA is that it goes too far in using an ethics-based approach.
B. Identification Testing: DNA and Criminal Law
The story of GINA and the ethical debates surrounding predictive
genetic testing are fairly well known. In contrast, Congress’s regulation of
genetic testing in criminal law and family law has been less studied and critiqued. We argue that there are several reasons for this. First, the genetic
testing at issue in those fields is identification testing, not predictive testing.
Identifying a person, rather than predicting who they might become, appears
at first glance to be less ethically fraught. Second, the approach has been
data-driven, not ethics-based. The passage of laws allowing for the creation
of DNA databanks and mandatory paternity testing occurred in response to
perceived crises, not in response to concerns about the influence of new
technology on individual rights. Taken together, these factors have led to
unintended consequences, errors, and potential ethical quandaries.
The use of DNA testing in criminal law is an apparent success story, in
which genetic evidence has made it possible to far more conclusively deter60 Of course, there are error rates with any form of genetic testing, and it would
depend on how valid and probative the prediction is; currently, many forms of identification testing are highly accurate, while many forms of predictive testing are not. If the state
of the technology changed, perhaps the regulation would proceed differently.
61 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 2.
62 See Slaughter, supra note 57, at 50.
63 See Paul L. Barber, Prenatal Diagnosis: An Ethical and a Regulatory Dilemma, 13 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 329 (2013).
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mine guilt or innocence in serious criminal cases. The regulations are data
focused, with the goal to identify past and future culprits. The legislation,
regulations, and policies of law enforcement, together with judicial review of
them, have all been direct and intentionally regulating genetic evidence. In
so doing, such regulation has largely neglected ethical and individual rights
concerns.
Moreover, the legal and regulatory story has been far more mixed. Relatively few criminal cases are susceptible to DNA testing. The databanks have
done much good: they have helped to solve crimes and to free the innocent.
But there are significantly diminished returns from expanding DNA
databanks to include broad categories of felons, misdemeanor convicts, and
arrestees, at the cost of overburdening crime labs, many of which face long
backlogs in conducting testing on evidence from crime scenes, and with
great costs to privacy.64 Use of DNA is asymmetrical, with widespread use to
assemble giant repositories of genetic information that raise real privacy concerns, but far more limited use of DNA tests to solve crimes and to potentially
free innocent convicts, raising due process concerns as well as accuracy concerns, given unwillingness of law enforcement to permit study of those
databanks. To return to our typology, not only have ethical concerns been
sidelined, but data-driven regulation has not worked as well as had been
hoped. Federal spending can be a blunt, unpredictable, and ill-managed
instrument. Judicial review could have addressed at least some ethical concerns regarding privacy and due process, but so far, highly deferential review
has largely elided those concerns.
1. DNA Arrives on the Scene
Beginning in the late 1980s, law enforcement in the United States began
to use DNA testing to link evidence from crime scenes to suspects. The federal government played a key role in the development and standardization of
techniques used. The British geneticist Sir Alec Jeffries pioneered the genetics research that made DNA testing possible in criminal cases by focusing on
short repetitive sequences within the genome that are highly variable
between individuals and can be isolated for testing. Jeffries later licensed
technology to conduct tests isolating those sequences to Imperial Chemical
Industries (ICI), which in turn opened its U.S. operation, called Cellmark, to
initially focus on paternity testing.65 Cellmark quickly began to market the
new technology to law enforcement, promoting “DNA FINGERPRINTING”
as a way to get “CONCLUSIVE RESULTS IN ONLY ONE TEST!”66 Soon,
64 For an excellent exploration of the underappreciated role local police and prosecutors play in the use of forensics, see Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward
a Systemic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1055–56 (2013).
65 See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 15, 17 (2007).
66 Id. at 19.
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competing private labs entered the market, the FBI began to perform DNA
tests, as did state crime labs.67
The FBI took a leading role to determine the form DNA tests would take
in criminal cases.68 The FBI chose an incompatible DNA testing system
using different enzymes than those used by Cellmark and the other leading
lab at the time, Lifecodes.69 The FBI trained forensic scientists on the new
protocols, created a national DNA database, and built a new DNA Analysis
Unit.70 Having taken the lead “largely by fiat” in developing standards for
DNA testing, the FBI left out not only private labs, but also academic scientists, defense attorneys, and others.71 Because of its head start and leadership
role, crime labs around the country sent evidence for DNA testing to the FBI
lab well into the 1990s.72
DNA technology improved dramatically by the mid-1990s, and as a
result, the use of DNA tests in criminal cases accelerated.73 Courts quickly
ruled DNA evidence was admissible evidence in criminal cases—admissible,
typically, to show the guilt of the defendant. Meanwhile, the federal government and some states enacted statutes permitting statutes of limitations to be
relaxed to allow prosecutors to bring charges years later based on DNA evidence, or by extending or abolishing statutes of limitations in rape cases.74
Concerns regarding unclear and inconsistent standards used to reach
conclusions about forensic DNA, in part because of the lack of transparency
and validation as the FBI adopted its DNA testing protocols, led to high-profile court challenges and academic disputes, nicknamed the “DNA Wars” of
the 1990s.75 The result was a different type of federal intervention: two
67

See id. at 33–88; see also DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVI(2010) (detailing developments in law and science concerning DNA admissibility in
U.S. courts).
68 See ARONSON, supra note 65, at 93–97.
69 Id. at 97.
70 See id. at 98–99, 112–13.
71 Id. at 118.
72 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL, at xxviii–xxix, 20 (1996).
73 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
HANDLING REQUESTS 27–28 (1999).
74 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3297 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(b)(1)(B) (West 2015)
(effective 2013); 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 3107(a) (West 2015) (effective 2001); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 767.24(3)(b) (West 2015) (effective 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 592–A:7(II) (West 2015) (effective 2014); see also Scott Akehurst–Moore, Note, An Appropriate Balance?—A Survey and Critique of State and Federal DNA Indictment and Tolling Statutes,
6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 213 (2006); Amy Dunn, Note, Criminal Law—Statutes of Limitation on
Sexual Assault Crimes: Has the Availability of DNA Evidence Rendered Them Obsolete?, 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 839 (2001). Additional states permit “DNA indictments” to toll a
statute of limitations. For example, see State v. Dabney, 663 N.W.2d 366, 372–74 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2003).
75 ARONSON supra note 65, at 120. Perhaps the best known was the case of People v.
Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. 1989); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: ChalDENCE
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National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences committees convened leading scientists to study the problem and arrive at standards for
forensic use of DNA testing.76 In addition, in 1993, Congress intervened and
enacted legislation authorizing the FBI to assemble DNA samples in a
national databank, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).77
2. DNA and Claims of Innocence
Legal efforts focused on collecting genetic data from potential criminal
culprits were largely one-sided. While legal actors moved quickly to allow
DNA to provide powerful evidence of guilt, the use of DNA testing to free the
innocent moved quite slowly. Although the first few convictions relying on
DNA tests were quickly followed, in 1989, with the first exonerations relying
on post-conviction DNA testing,78 in the 1990s only two states had statutes
providing a right to access post-conviction DNA testing.79 Many of the people freed by DNA tests in the first decade and a half of its use waited many
years to obtain those tests. Today, all fifty states have enacted statutes providing access to DNA and post-conviction relief.80 However, many of those statutes contain sharp restrictions on access to DNA testing, including bars on
testing if the defense lawyer should have requested testing at trial, limits on
access to persons convicted of certain felonies, and bars to testing of persons
who pleaded guilty or did not litigate the issue of identity at their trials.81
Further, courts have interpreted the statutes in strained ways that have made
it still more difficult for prisoners to obtain testing.82
In contrast to these developments in the states, beginning with its 1993
decision in Herrera v. Collins, the Court has remained steadfastly unwilling to
lenging the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed.,
2006).
76 See ARONSON, supra note 65, at 146–72; COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI. ET
AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); COMM. ON
DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC
DNA EVIDENCE (1996). For criticism of the federal role in forensics more generally, see
Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53.
77 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 8 (2000), as reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323,
2324.
78 Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1648 (2008).
79 Id. at 1631, 1646–50, 1673–75.
80 For a graphic illustrating the adoption of post-conviction DNA testing statutes, see
Today, All 50 States Have DNA Access Laws, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/dna_innocenceproject_website.pdf (last visited
Dec. 4, 2015).
81 See id.; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS:
EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 164 (2013); Rebecca Stephens,
Note, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who Plead Guilty and Those Convicted at
Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations for Reform, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
309, 314–15 (2013).
82 See Garrett, supra note 78, at 1677–79; Stephens, supra note 81, at 320–23.
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recognize, but has assumed the hypothetical existence of, any constitutional
right to challenge a conviction based on “truly persuasive” evidence of
“actual innocence.”83 In the 2006 case of House v. Bell, when the Court had
the opportunity to directly confront the question whether to recognize an
actual innocence claim, it chose not to do so, again simply assuming its
availability.84
In District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, the Court squarely confronted
whether there is a constitutional right to secure DNA testing.85 William
Osborne, a man convicted of rape in Alaska, sought post-conviction DNA
testing that the State conceded could conclusively establish his innocence.
Alaska was one of three states at the time that had no post-conviction DNA
testing statute and refused to grant the test. The Court ruled that Osborne
had no freestanding constitutional right to DNA testing. However, the Court
did say he had a procedural due process right to DNA testing based on “a
liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under
state law.”86 The Court largely relied on federalism reasons in ruling that
ability to obtain a post-conviction DNA test would be dependent on state law
remedies. A state has no obligation to make post-conviction DNA testing
available in the first place, but if a state does so (as all states, the federal
government, and the District of Columbia have now done), a litigant like
Osborne would have to show that state statutory mechanisms were arbitrary
and violated procedural due process. Some litigants have successfully challenged state DNA testing laws on the basis that they arbitrarily exclude categories of individuals from access to testing, but other courts have ruled that
the Osborne decision leaves wide latitude to states.87 In effect, the Court,
while recognizing the remarkable power of DNA testing, chose to leave the
regulation of post-conviction DNA testing to the states, even where the state
in question, Alaska, could offer no reason, much less a compelling reason, as
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, for denying Osborne the DNA test he
requested.88 Once again, judicial review of rights in genetic evidence was
highly deferential, and not based on any careful balancing of government
and individual interests or analysis of individual rights.

83 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
84 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
85 557 U.S. 52, 67–72 (2009).
86 Id. at 68.
87 For additional discussion of the possible implications of the Osborne decision, see
Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919 (2010).
88 Osborne, 557 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Throughout the course of state
and federal litigation, the State has failed to provide any concrete reason for denying Osborne the DNA testing he seeks, and none is apparent. . . . Insofar as the State has
articulated any reason at all, it appears to be a generalized interest in protecting the finality
of the judgment of conviction from any possible future attacks.”).
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3. Federal Support for DNA Databanks
In contrast to the slow and uneven response to the use of DNA to potentially free the innocent, a raft of federal legislation funded and expanded the
use of DNA to identify the guilty. This legislation was intentionally and
directly focused on collecting genetic data. The national DNA databank,
CODIS, is a federal creation, but it is also a joint state and federal effort.89
The effort began in 1990 informally, and CODIS was established in 1994,
following federal legislation, the 1993 the DNA Identification Act, that
allowed the FBI to assemble DNA samples in a national databank.90 Each
state collects DNA profiles, which can then be accessed and searched by the
FBI software, with any resulting “matches” then provided to the law enforcement agency. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) provided the FBI with authority to add to CODIS the DNA profiles
of federal offenders, but the DOJ was uncertain as to its authority.91 In 2000,
the DNA Act provided authority to collect profiles from federal offenders.92
CODIS now contains over eleven million profiles, and it continues to
expand.93 The FBI reports that it “has produced over 293,808 hits assisting
in more than 279,741 investigations.”94 These DNA profiles currently contain information from thirteen loci that are very useful for identification of
individuals, but not for predicting future medical outcomes or characteristics
of individuals.
All fifty states and the federal government have now enacted laws permitting collection of DNA from those convicted of serious felonies. Federal legislation has continued to expand the list of qualifying crimes, with the 2001
USA PATRIOT Act expanding qualifying federal crimes95 and the 2004 Justice for All Act expanding collection to all federal felons.96 In twenty-nine
states arrestees and detainees—many of whom are never charged or convicted—can have profiles entered into the database; for example, over a
dozen states require that all felony arrestees have DNA entered, half of the
89 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FBI, CODIS: COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM 2 (2012), https://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-brochure-2010.
90 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 8 (2000), as reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323,
2324.
91 Id.
92 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 6, 114 Stat.
2726, 2733 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132(a), 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2012)).
93 See FBI, CODIS—NDIS STATISTICS (2015), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/
ndis-statistics.
94 Id.
95 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat. 272, 364 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(2)); see also Regulations Under the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000, 68 Fed. Reg. 74855 (Dec. 29, 2003) (describing the final rule
specifying federal offenses to be treated as qualifying offenses for DNA testing).
96 See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203(b), 118 Stat. 2260, 2270
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)); see also DNA Sample Collection from Federal Offenders Under the Justice for All Act of 2004, 70 Fed. Reg. 4763, 4764 (Jan. 31, 2005) (publishing an interim rule to implement section 203(b) of Justice for All Act).
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states require that murder and sex crime arrestees have DNA entered in the
CODIS, while several states extend DNA collection to misdemeanor arrests.97
These requirements were prompted by 2005 federal legislation permitting
arrestee DNA to be entered into CODIS.98 However, few of those states allow
defense lawyers access to the databases for searches that might show clients’
innocence; only nine states do so.99 Very few states have conducted even ad
hoc reviews of closed cases to discover potential wrongful convictions. One
of the few such audits, conducted in Virginia, resulted in several
exonerations.100
DNA collection efforts have been challenged in lawsuits raising a series
of privacy and constitutional challenges, all of which have proved unsuccessful.101 This litigation culminated in the case of Maryland v. King, in which
the Supreme Court found it constitutional under the Fourth Amendment to
take DNA from persons arrested for “serious offense[s].”102
Federal largesse has facilitated DNA collection. In 2000, when CODIS
was expanded yet again, Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act to supply grants to states for DNA lab work.103 The findings
included the statement that although “States have received millions of dollars
in DNA-related grants,” nevertheless, not only had there been inadequate use
of DNA testing post-conviction to potentially free the innocent, but “more
funding is needed to improve State forensic facilities and to reduce the
nationwide backlog of DNA samples from convicted offenders and crime
97 State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses, DNARESOURCE.COM (Sept. 2011), http:/
/www.dnaresource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses2011.pdf. For a more up-todate summary, see DNA Arrest Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/dna-arrestee-laws.aspx (last visited Sept.
20, 2015). The three states extending DNA collection to misdemeanor arrests are Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15.609 (West 2015); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 411.1471(a)(3) (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2(A) (West 2015).
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (permitting arrestee profiles to be entered); Violence
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109162, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2960, 3085 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a); Michelle Hibbert, DNA
Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 775–76
(1999).
99 See Ethan Bronner, Lawyers, Saying DNA Cleared Inmate, Pursue Access to Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/us/lawyers-saying-dnacleared-inmate-pursue-access-to-data.html.
100 See Frank Green, Results of Post-Conviction DNA Testing to be Released, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH (May 10, 2012), http://www.richmond.com/archive/article_431ce8879459-52df-b0c7-aaf49b8f96dc.html.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Reynard, 473 F.3d 1008, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 2003); Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime:
Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 937–40 (2001). But see
In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding DNA collection of juvenile to be unconstitutional).
102 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977–78 (2013).
103 See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, §§ 1–3, 114
Stat. 2726, 2726–31 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2012)).
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scenes that need to be tested or retested using upgraded methods.”104 The
federal funding allocated was substantial. For example, between 1999 and
2007, the federal government allocated $560 million to the states to eliminate backlogs as DNA database demands began to tax the capacities of crime
labs.105 In 2003, President Bush announced a one-billion-dollar “DNA Initiative.”106 However, not all allocated money was spent. In 2010, the National
Institute for Justice (NIJ) awarded less than $65 million in DNA Backlog
Elimination Program grants—less than half of the $151 million that Congress
authorized.107
Underfunding explains in part why backlogs continue to tax state and
federal law enforcement, with nationwide backlogs of over 500,000 cases.108
These DNA collection efforts have been the victim of their own success; the
result has been even greater backlogs in processing all of these DNA tests.109
The voluminous DNA processing of convicted offenders and arrestees can be
more straightforward and less expensive, in a given case at least, than DNA
testing samples from crime scenes, which may involve mixtures of several person’s profiles, deteriorated samples, and more need for analysis and interpretation. The backlog problem is quite urgent at some labs. Consider, for
example, the case of Cody Davis, an innocent man misidentified by the eyewitnesses to a robbery in Florida. The ski mask worn by the robber was not
DNA tested before trial, due to backlogs at the crime lab; only four months
104 Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-561, § 4(a)(12), 114 Stat. 2787, 2792 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135 note).
105 Richard Willing, DNA Lag Leaves Potential for Crime, USA TODAY (Sept. 3, 2007),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-03-dnainside_N.htm.
106 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. & NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 71 (2009).
107 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DNA Backlog Reduction Program, http://nij.gov/topics/
forensics/lab-operations/evidence-backlogs/backlog-reduction-program.htm (last modified Dec. 16, 2014); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, LETTER TO HON.
PATRICK J. LEAHY (Mar. 20, 2012), http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/lab-operations/evi
dence-backlogs/documents/dna-backlog-reduction-report-to-congress-2011.pdf.
108 See Cindy Horswell, Texas Policy Leaves Big Loophole in Criminal DNA Testing, HOUS.
CHRON. (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Texas-policy
-leaves-big-loophole-in-criminal-DNA-1704366.php (citing critics complaining that “rapid
expansion of databanks is costly and creating backlogs of DNA profiling of serious offenders”); Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/us/19DNA.html. But see Dave Altimari &
Matthew Kauffman, DNA Evidence Sits for Months, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 31, 2010),
http://articles.courant.com/2010-01-31/news/10013012587669_1_dna-evidence-dna-sam
ple-national-dna-databank/2 (describing effects of backlogs in Connecticut, “departments
submitting DNA evidence from a homicide scene can expect to wait as long as nine months
for processing, unless it is a high-profile case”); Horswell, supra (noting that Virginia claims
that “11 percent of Virginia’s nearly 6,000 hits have come from arrestees”).
109 See Julia Preston, U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
5, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/05/washington/05dna.html; Katherine L.
Prevost O’Connor, Note, Eliminating the Rape-Kit Backlog: Bringing Necessary Changes to the
Criminal Justice System, 72 UMKC L. REV. 193, 211–13 (2003).
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after the trial was the mask DNA tested, and the results cleared him and led
to his post-conviction DNA exoneration.110 The most recent statistics available on crime lab activities show the same problem: DNA tests are only a third
of the work of public crime labs, but account for seventy-five percent of
backlogs. In turn, although DNA analysis in actual criminal casework is less
than twenty-five percent of the DNA testing crime labs performed, over one
third of the 1.1 million backlogged requests were for DNA samples from
casework.111
Analyzing DNA from actual crime scenes can be far more expensive and
complex than simply loading profiles into a database, as noted.112 Congress
has intervened to encourage more use of federal funding to do DNA testing
in live criminal cases. However, these efforts have not been very successful.
Money under the Act often remains unspent, which can result in denial of
grant requests for the next year. Reasons may include cumbersome reporting requirements, poor reporting by local jurisdictions, the burden of growing backlogs, reluctance by local law enforcement to conduct DNA testing in
criminal investigations, and perhaps most important of all, poor local law
enforcement training and resources to collect DNA from crime scenes.113 In
2004, the DNA Backlog Elimination Act was renamed the Debbie Smith Act,
after a rape victim,114 and in name and in its intent, the Act changed the
focus to criminal investigations.115 The text of the Act requires that forty
percent of grant money be used on “samples from crime scenes.”116 Yet that
110 See The Cases: Cody Davis, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/Content/Cody_Davis.php (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
111 See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES, 2009, 4 tbls.4, 5 (2012); see also
Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
18–20, Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207).
112 Crime Labs Struggle with Flood of DNA Samples (NPR broadcast Dec. 11, 2007), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17128750 (“If it costs around $100 to test
an individual, it could cost more than $1,000 to test a crime scene” and a crime lab “suddenly has to balance an existing backlog of crime scene samples with tens of thousands of
known offenders who have to be added to the database right away.”).
113 See Milli Kanani Hansen, Note, Testing Justice: Prospects for Constitutional Claims by
Victims Whose Rape Kits Remain Untested, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 943, 949–50 (2011).
114 Pub. L. No. 108-405, §§ 201–202, 118 Stat. 2260, 2266 (2004).
115 During hearings, for example, then-U.S. Senator Joseph Biden stated:
There are over 800,000 so-called rape case kits sitting on shelves of the cities
where you live and the States you represent. They have never been tested because
of the cost of testing them. The bottom line is that an estimated 48 percent of
outstanding rapes could be solved by just comparing the database that will come
from testing these kits and the existing database in our State prison systems where
DNA is already on the record.
150 CONG. REC. S10917 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Biden).
116 42 U.S.C. §§ 14135(a)(2), (c)(3)(B) (2012). The Act provides funding for: “DNA
analyses of samples from crime scenes, including samples from rape kits.” Id.
§ 14135(a)(2). The Act does not specifically address rape investigations. In response, Senator Al Franken introduced legislation not enacted, which would allocate funding for
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was a reduction: it had been the case that fifty percent of grants had to be
used for testing of crime scene evidence.117 Federal grants are designed in a
way that makes backlogs worse. Although federal grants have been chiefly
allocated to crime laboratories, the demands of entering profiles into the
CODIS extend far beyond the costs of the testing itself. Prison officials must
track who must be tested and who has already been entered in the database,
samples must be taken from prisoners, and then samples must be brought to
the crime lab. The costs for enacting DNA collection from arrestees may be
even more substantial. Some states have decided not to go that far specifically for cost reasons.118 On the other hand, police departments may create
their own DNA databases that go farther.119 States can also defray costs
through criminal fines; many states now charge DNA databank fees to convicts.120 States vary in their participation in CODIS; some upload profiles
more aggressively than others.121 A 2012 Senate Report noted that “a significant backlog of DNA samples and rape kits remains in public crime laboratories” and expressed concerns that large sums of grants approved by the
National Institute of Justice have been awarded to “entities of dubious merit,”
including policy groups that did not themselves do DNA testing.122
That is not to say CODIS does not serve important goals. In many
thousands of cases, CODIS identifies culprits or clears innocent people during criminal investigations. Forty-five percent of the first 250 DNA exonerations also involved the post-conviction identification of the culprit, often due
backlogs in rape cases specifically. S. 2736, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Sen. Franken’s Floor
Statement on the Introduction fo [sic] the Justice for Survivors of Sexual Assault Act, AL FRANKEN
(Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=news&id=700.
117 42 U.S.C. § 14135 amendments. Prior to repeal, former subparagraph (A) read:
“For fiscal year 2005, not less than 50 percent of the grant amounts shall be awarded for
purposes under subsection (a)(2) . . . .” Id.
118 Patrick Marley, DNA Bill Finds Growing Support, J. SENTINEL (Milwaukee, WI) (Dec.
26, 2009), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/80148687.html (predicting that
the measure “would cost $6.4 million in its first year and $4.1 million a year thereafter”).
119 See Tami Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.? A DNA Sample Could Buy Freedom, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/17/local/me-oc-dna17; Joseph
Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/us/police-agencies-are-assembling-records-of-dna.html?_
r=0.
120 John Stith, Judge Makes the Call on DNA Fee Even if Defendant’s DNA Is in State
Databank, Some Judges Require the Fee Be Paid Again, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Apr. 8, 2007,
2007 WLNR 6786237 (describing $50 DNA databank fee, sometimes even where there is
no need for an additional DNA test). The DNA databank fee in New York goes “into
government coffers for general use.” Kirsten D. Levingston, The Cost of Staying Out of Jail,
N.Y. TIMES (April 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/opinion/nyregionopin
ions/02CIlevingston.html?_r=0.
121 See FBI, supra note 93.
122 S. REP. NO. 112-78, at 77 (2011) (“NIJ appears to fritter away forensic and DNA
analysis funding by broadly dispersing grants to agencies and entities of dubious merit.”);
see also Ben Protess, The DNA Debacle: How the Federal Government Botched the DNA Backlog
Crisis, PROPUBLICA (May 5, 2009), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-dna-debaclehow-the-federal-government-botched-the-backlog-crisis-505.
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to a “cold hit” in CODIS.123 Sometimes the exoneration was motivated in
part because DNA showed not only innocence but the guilt of an identifiable
person. CODIS is a powerful tool. However, its size and the resources allocated to it have come at a cost to not only the ethics-based concerns but also
the very goal that legislators were focused on: the goal of using data to solve
crimes.
Delays or failure to conduct DNA testing may undergird decisions not to
pursue cases, and they may discourage victims from cooperating and lead to
failures to prosecute.124 A 2009 National Institute of Justice survey found
that in “18 percent of open, unsolved rape cases, forensic evidence had not
been submitted to a crime lab.”125 One of the few surveys conducted of use
of forensics in criminal cases, led by Joseph Peterson, sampled over 4,000
crimes in five jurisdictions, and found that “most evidence goes unexamined”
and no evidence is collected and no forensics tests are conducted, even for
quite serious offenses.126 After all, crime scene investigators have “varying
levels of training and experience.”127
Individual rights are sidelined; for example, defense rights to access
CODIS data to potentially prove innocence. CODIS does permit disclosure
of data for “criminal defense purposes, to a defendant.”128 However, only
nine states provide defendants with access to the DNA databases, and absent
such statutory authority, defense access may depend on whether prosecutors
agree to request such a test.129 DNA testing for the defense does not receive
the same federal largesse. The “Justice For All Act” allocated five million
dollars a year for conducting post-conviction DNA testing, under the Kirk
Bloodsworth DNA testing program (named after the first death row inmate
exonerated by DNA).130 That funding is small compared with over $100 mil123 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 5 (2011).
124 See, e.g., Armen Keteyian, Exclusive: Rape in America: Justice Denied, CBS NEWS (Nov. 9,
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/exclusive-rape-in-america-justice-denied/.
125 Editorial, Respect for Rape Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/11/14/opinion/14sat3.html.
126 JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 9 (2010). For example, physical evidence was collected in only 20% of
robberies, 30% of aggravated assaults, and 75% of rape cases. Id. at 15, 46. The one area
in which physical evidence was typically collected was homicides, in which 97% ninetyseven percent had physical evidence. Even where the evidence was collected, it was not
always tested. Id. at 77.
127 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 35. For a discussion of the importance
of focusing more on crime scene evidence collection, rather than databank expansion,
with detailed recommendations for informed improvements, see MURPHY, supra note 13, at
272–81.
128 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3)(C) (2012).
129 Bronner, supra note 99; see Jason Kreag, Letting Innocence Suffer: The Need for Defense
Access to the Law Enforcement DNA Database, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 805 (2015).
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 14136e(a), (b). The Kirk Bloodsworth Post-Conviction DNA Testing
Grant Program made available five million dollars per year for post-conviction DNA testing. It also incentivized states to enact post-conviction DNA testing laws. See Press Release,
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Oversight of the Justice for All Act: Has the Justice Department Effec-
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lion allocated each year for backlog elimination (which itself is apparently
often not fully spent). The Bush Administration had “resisted implementing
the program for several years,” and the funding remained entirely unspent
for four years.131
Indeed, not only defense lawyers, but prosecutors may be left in the dark
should evidence of innocence surface. CODIS is not well connected to local
prosecutors. CODIS hits in cold cases result in notification to local police,
who likely closed the case, but not to prosecutors, who would know if there
had been a conviction (possibly of the wrong person).132 Many jurisdictions
have no policy in place to respond to a DNA hit in a closed case.133 As a
result, CODIS hits may receive no follow-up.134
The philosophy of “more data is good” has meant that labs have not
focused on which data are the most useful or important. The labs themselves
may make mistakes as they invest in processing entries and not in quality
control and independent auditing.135 Separate money was allocated for
grants to improve the quality of forensics work.136 That grant money went
unspent entirely for years after the statute was passed.137 An audit by the
Office of the Inspector General found NIJ was not requiring recipient labs to
comply with requirements that they put in place independent auditing mechanisms.138 To this day, the Department of Justice still has not insisted laboratively Administered the Bloodsworth and Coverdell DNA Grant Programs? (Jan. 23, 2008),
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/oversight-of-the-justice-for-all-act-has-the-justice-depart
ment-effectively-administered-the-bloodsworth-and-coverdell-dna-grant-programs.
131 Press Release, VTDigger, Leahy Continues Effort to Reauthorize Historic Justice for
All Act (Feb. 1, 2011), http://vtdigger.org/2011/02/01/leahy-continues-effort-to-reauthor
ize-historic-justice-for-all-act/; see also Laurie Kellman, Those Exonerated Push DNA Analyses,
BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/
2008/01/24/those_exonerated_push_dna_analyses/.
132 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY 6 (2011), http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/
postconviction/roundtable/welcome.htm.
133 Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, The Peril of DNA: It’s Not Perfect, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/26/local/me-dna26.
134 Id. For example, Oakland police formed a cold case unit to run old cases in the
CODIS and obtained an “overall offender hit rate of 48 percent.” Kamika Dunlap & Barbara Grady, Oakland Cold Cases No Longer on the Back Burner, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR (Ca), May
29, 2009, 2009 WLNR 10261283 (also noting “backlogs of samples waiting to be analyzed”);
Tragic Consequeneces of Missing DNA Samples, CBSNEWS (Dec. 14, 2009, 11:18 AM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/tragic-consequences-of-missing-dna-samples/ (“An Associated
Press review found tens of thousands of DNA samples are missing from state databanks
across the country because they were never taken or were lost.”).
135 Jason Borenstein, DNA in the Legal System: The Benefits Are Clear, the Problems Aren’t
Always, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 847, 855–57 (2006).
136 Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (codified at 42 U.S. Code §3797j et seq.).
137 Erin Murphy, What ‘Strengthening Forensic Science’ Today Means for Tomorrow: DNA
Exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report, 9 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 7, 11 (2010).
138 See Oversight of the Justice for All Act: Hearing on S. 110-973 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4–6 (2008) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S.
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tories comply with those rules. Also troubling may be the spillover effect on
the vast majority of the work that crime labs do that is not DNA testing.139 A
landmark National Academy of Sciences report in 2009 explored the urgent
need for national scientific standards and stronger oversight and quality control of our entire system of forensics, calling for the creation of a National
Institute of Forensic Science.140 None of those recommendations has yet
been enacted in federal legislation.141
4. The Supreme Court Steps Away
Some of these policy dynamics, in which a focus on data generated too
much information and not always the right kinds, and raising still additional
individual rights concerns, might have been mitigated had the judiciary chosen to intervene. In Maryland v. King, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
found suspicionless searches of arrestees permissible under the Fourth
Amendment, justifying taking DNA from arrestees as a matter of identifying
them for “routine booking” purposes.142 Yet, as Justice Antonin Scalia made
clear in a forceful dissent, adding an arrestee profile to the national DNA
databank does not help police identify the person at all: the sole purpose,
since these people are searched as against unsolved crime scene profiles, is to
solve unsolved crimes. As Justice Scalia put it: “The Court’s assertion that
DNA is being taken, not to solve crimes, but to identify those in the State’s
custody, taxes the credulity of the credulous.”143 Indeed, the majority admitted that the reason to take DNA is “for the sole purpose of generating a
unique identifying number against which future samples may be
matched.”144 There is no disagreement that people convicted of crimes can
Dep’t of Justice); id. at 14–17 (statement of Peter Neufeld on Behalf of the Innocence
Project).
139 See MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES, 2005 (2008), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpffcl05.pdf.
140 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 106. For some of the large body
of academic work criticizing the use of forensics and quality control at crime labs, see for
example Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 22, Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and
Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007), and Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific
Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 745–56 (2007).
141 DOJ has now convened a National Commission on Forensic Science to examine
systemic problems facing forensics in the U.S. and to establish national standards. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and National Institute of Standards
and Technology Announce Launch of National Commission on Forensic Science (Feb. 15,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-and-national-institute-standards
-and-technology-announce-launch-national. NIST has recently created an Organization of
Scientific Area Committees to examine and approve standards for forensics as well. See
Forensic Science Standards Effort Takes Shape as NIST Appoints Scientific Area Committees Members,
NIST (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/forensics/sac-members-announcement.cfm.
142 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
143 Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 1979 (majority opinion).
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be searched in that manner, but it is far from clear that it helps police much
to additionally search people arrested but not convicted (indeed, those people are far more likely to be the ones who were wrongly arrested). But for
the Court to say that permanent DNA searching of people based on an arrest
is nothing more than “an extension of methods of identification long used” is
simply unsupported if not disingenuous.145
Far more direct in its reasoning was a lower court decision citing to a
government interest in “the development and maintenance of a DNA
database to assist in the solving of past and prospective crimes.”146 That ruling was a challenge to taking DNA from persons on probation, who traditionally have fewer expectations of privacy. The judge found it too “speculative”
to assert an interest in the need to monitor an individual like the plaintiff,
who had engaged in misuse of Social Security benefits, not a crime for which
DNA testing would be useful to solve.147 That decision was reversed by the
First Circuit, which used reasoning prefiguring King, holding that absent evidence of “demonstrated misuse of the DNA samples” or predictive “new uses”
for the DNA tested, DNA tests were permitted.148
Some implications of the King ruling are quite troubling. Vast numbers
of people, as many as one-third of Americans, have been arrested by age
twenty-three, not including for traffic offenses.149 Now any person arrested
for a “serious” offense can have their DNA taken, even if charges are later
reduced, or dropped, or the person is acquitted. The Court nowhere defines
a “serious” offense (indeed, the Court may mean to include traffic offenses,
which are named in the majority opinion as examples of crimes for which
serious offenders might be stopped but remain undetected by the police).150
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, relied on King to find constitutional a
California statute requiring DNA testing of persons arrested for any felony.151 And the Supreme Court’s rulings on what counts as probable cause
for arrest, combined with broad criminal statutes, mean police will have
nearly unfettered authority to obtain DNA samples.152
145 Id. at 1976 (quoting United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1932)).
146 United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269–70 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d, 532
F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008).
147 Id. at 272.
148 United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007)).
149 Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National
Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 21 (2012) (“By age 18, the in-sample cumulative arrest prevalence rate lies between 15.9% and 26.8%; at age 23, it lies between 25.3% and 41.4%.”).
150 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1971 (“People detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the
most devious and dangerous criminals. Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy
McVeigh was stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was driving without a license
plate.” (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct.
1510, 1520 (2012))).
151 Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
152 Tracey Maclin, Maryland v. King: Terry v. Ohio Redux, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 359,
402–03.
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This dragnet will not help to solve many more crimes, for all of the reasons already described, even if crime solving was a permissible reason to conduct suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amendment. States like
California, which had already expanded DNA databanks to include arrestees,
did not generate many more matches between offenders and crime scenes,
even as compared to states like New York and Illinois with much smaller
databases. Why? As researchers at the RAND Corporation found, New York
and Illinois still enter crime scene samples at rates comparable to California’s.153 Adding more samples from crime scenes, not taking DNA from lowlevel arrestees, solves more cases.154 As Erin Murphy and one of us have put
it, “The lesson is clear: The police solve more crimes not by taking DNA from
suspects who have never been convicted, but by collecting more evidence at
crime scenes.”155 The Court adopted a highly strained interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment that will bring with it only minor gains to law enforcement; the result may overburden crime labs at the expense of live criminal
cases.
Still more interesting were the Supreme Court’s reservations concerning
future uses of DNA tests of arrestees to do more than simply identify them,
but to engage in prediction or examine other genetic characteristics. The
majority in King emphasized how current testing examines “noncoding parts
of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee,” but also that
“science can always progress further, and those progressions may have Fourth
Amendment consequences.”156 The Court added that under Maryland’s statute “[n]o purpose other than identification is permissible,” and that “[i]f in
the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s
predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant
to identity, that case would present additional privacy concerns not present
here.”157 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that retention of an underlying blood sample, post-DNA testing and entry into CODIS, is also permitted,
153

JEREMIAH GOULKA ET AL., RAND CORP., TOWARD A COMPARISON OF DNA PROFILING
DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 19–20 (2010).
154 Data from the United Kingdom showed the same pattern. Despite a “massive
increase” in addition of arrestee samples under the United Kingdom’s DNA Expansion
Program, there was no “noticeable increase in the number of crimes detected using DNA.”
GENEWATCH UK, NATIONAL DNA DATABASE: SUBMISSION TO THE HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
7 (2010), www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/GWsub_
Jan10.doc. Even what little data we have on “investigations aided” by hits in DNA databases
are misleading, since we “know little about the outcomes of most ‘hits’” and whether they
in fact result in convictions that would not have otherwise occurred. Frederick R. Bieber,
Turning Base Hits into Earned Runs: Improving the Effectiveness of Forensic DNA Data Bank Programs, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 227 (2006).
155 Brandon L. Garrett & Erin Murphy, Too Much Information, SLATE (Feb. 12, 2013,
8:22 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/dna
_collection_at_the_supreme_court_maryland_v_king.html; see also MURPHY, supra note 13,
at 160–63.
156 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013).
157 Id. at 1979.

AND

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl206.txt

788

unknown

Seq: 32

notre dame law review

29-JAN-16

15:54

[vol. 91:2

although noting that “if scientific discoveries make clear that junk DNA
reveals more about individuals than we have previously understood, we
should reconsider the government’s DNA collection programs.”158
Can a meaningful line be drawn between identification and predictive
uses? Time will tell whether these databases will expand not just in the number of profiles, but also in the uses that this genetic information is put to. In
a sense, the databases are designed not just to identify individuals in the present, but to link them with future crimes; such a system is not simply one that
verifies a person’s identity. It is not predictive, but it is certainly not limited
in time either. The constrained concept of “relevant to identity” that the
Court adopted made its analysis of the privacy implications of having one’s
genetic profile permanently entered in a database highly artificial.
This is all the more true where, although most states currently permit
the use of DNA databank statistics for studying population statistics as well as
identification of remains, as David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger
describe, few states address much less restrict other possible uses, including
research, familial searches, or the “re-purposing” of the underlying DNA samples themselves.159 The line between what is “relevant to identity” and not
may not be so clear after all. Indeed, crime labs have already, without statutory authorization, permitted familial searches for partial matches that might
lead law enforcement to family members of the offender.160 The FBI
changed its policy to permit such searches in 2009, and a number of states
apparently now engage in the practice.161 Such searches are used to identify
individuals, but by linking them through family members; is such a use really
strictly “relevant to identity”? And there are local DNA databanks that are
not shared with CODIS and not subject to these regulations.162 The FBI has
announced interest in expanding CODIS to include additional loci for DNA
testing, which it can do by providing Congress with written notice 180 days
before doing so.163 But most important, DNA technology is rapidly evolving.
158 United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013).
159 Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 35, 54 (2014); David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating Information Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government Data
Systems, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366, 372 (2006); Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 284 (2005) (“While law enforcement authorities would like us to believe that the
samples will never be used for anything besides catching criminals, an unlimited span of
improper uses remain plausible so long as those samples are retained.”). Others remain
unconcerned. David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric
Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1155–58 (2013).
160 Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV.
291, 302 (2010). For a defense of the practice, see David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives:
A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (2013).
161 Murphy, supra note 160, at 302.
162 Goldstein, supra note 119. For an excellent in-depth analysis, see Jason Kreag,
Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1491 (2015).
163 The Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203(f), 118 Stat. 2260, 2271.
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Other uses of DNA samples are under development and more dramatically
expand beyond current uses. Examples of these expansions include a forensic chip that uses DNA samples to ascertain “biogeographic ancestry and
externally visible characteristics” such as appearance, and a service called
“Snapshot” that offers to produce a composite image of a person’s face using
a DNA test.164
To be sure, even if the Court had decided King another way, law enforcement could concededly test people convicted of crimes, and doing so could
still assemble a vast and powerful DNA database. New York State now has an
“all crimes” database collecting DNA from people convicted of felonies and
also all misdemeanors.165 However, the rationale for taking DNA from people not convicted of crimes is more equivocal. As Justice Scalia pointed out,
where law enforcement can already take DNA from people like King who
were convicted, the only net benefit offered by the Court is that DNA can
now be taken from people who are eventually acquitted or who have charges
dropped or dismissed: the very people for whom the privacy cost is greatest
and the social interest in searching and retaining DNA is the least. In its
reasoning, the Court emphasized what was “relevant to identity,” drawing a
possible line at predictive uses of genetics, but without explaining why the
line should be drawn at that place. The intrusion on the individual was
described in terms of the swabbing of a cheek, and not the genetic nature of
what was taken. At great cost to an unarticulated concern with genetic privacy, the Court provided law enforcement with equivocal gains.
There is another reason why closer scrutiny was warranted. Data-driven
regulation of genetics may disproportionately impact the least politically powerful. All of this DNA collection in criminal cases has a racial impact. The
collection of DNA from arrestees and convicts reflects the disproportionate
numbers of minorities arrested and convicted.166 Minorities are therefore
far more likely to have their DNA included and more likely to be identified
using those databanks. Some have argued that the largest DNA databases
possible would avoid equality concerns and prove more effective.167 Currently, the federal mandate has meant that states are unable to completely
prevent this effect from spreading, but at the same time, states vary widely in
164 Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 22, at 38–39; Brendan Keating et al., First All-in-One
Diagnostic Tool for DNA Intelligence: Genome-Wide Inference of Biogeographic Ancestry, Appearance,
Relatedness, and Sex with the Identitas v1 Forensic Chip, 127 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 559, 560
(2013); Laura Burgess, Forensic Expert to Conduct Review of Parabon’s DNA Based Composite
Sketch Tool, AMMOLAND (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.ammoland.com/2015/02/forensicexpert-to-conduct-review-of-parabons-dna-based-composite-sketch-tool/#axzz3m8ARmLIp.
165 Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo, Senate Majority,
Leader Skelos, and Assembly Speaker Silver Announce Historic Agreement on Expansion
of DNA Databank (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomosenate-majority-leader-skelos-and-assembly-speaker-silver-announce-historic-0.
166 Moore, supra note 108, at 4.
167 David H. Kaye et al., Is a DNA Identification Database in Your Future?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 4,
5–9, 19 (2001); see Michael E. Smith, Let’s Make the DNA Identification Database as Inclusive as
Possible, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 385 (2006).
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the extent of their DNA collection, perhaps because of uneven compliance
by local law enforcement in addition to differences in DNA collection statutes, but perhaps because of different attitudes towards the larger ethical
concerns that broader DNA collection raises. Two state courts have, in contrast to the federal approach, called into question DNA collection statutes.168
The implications of highly uneven use of genetic evidence in criminal cases
may be felt far more over the years to come.
And compare the treatment of a more privileged group whose DNA is
very important for crime solving: police officers. Their DNA is important to
collect to rule out contamination of crime scene evidence; law enforcement
unions have successfully opposed requirements to give DNA samples, and
officers have sued claiming workplace relation for failing to give DNA
samples.169
C. DNA, Federal Benefits, and Family Law
Identifying criminal culprits is not the only potential use for identification testing. In family law, DNA can be used to identify with near certainty
the genetic parent of a given child. Unlike in criminal law, federal actors
have adopted an incidentally data-driven approach; the federal goal was not
primarily in collecting genetic evidence, but rather to establish paternity and
avoid non-payment of child support to welfare recipients. Unlike in criminal
law, a data-driven use of genetics fits less comfortably with the larger legal
and ethical goals of the area. It is not self-evident that family law’s primary
goal should be identifying the “real” genetic parent, as a police officer might
find a “real” culprit through DNA testing. In many cases, it may not be the
genetic parent-child relationship that is the most enduring at all, but instead
an adoptive or functional parent-child bond. As a result, the data-driven use
of identification testing in family law raises ethical concerns and complicates
family law’s traditional aims.
1. Parentage and DNA Testing in State Family Law
Traditionally, family law, like criminal law, has been an area dominated
by the states.170 State courts, not federal courts, grant divorces to married
couples, determine whether someone is a child’s legal parent, and decide
168 State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 676 (Vt. 2014) (“The technology may better accomplish law enforcement goals but the invasion of privacy may change and increase, and the
rules in place to protect legitimate privacy interests may become more fragile.”); People v.
Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 775–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), rev. granted 342 P.3d 415 (Cal.
2015).
169 See, e.g., Dave Collins, Conn. Officials, Detective Settle DNA Dispute, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 8,
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/02/08/state-police-settle-detective-lawsuit-over-dna-collection/59PBbvsQk4fsRGwrrF5t7N/story.html.
170 Cf. Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297,
1318 (1998) (arguing as a historical matter, courts’ understanding of family law as
“quintessentially local” is inaccurate).
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which parents will receive custody rights or visitation with their children.171
State legislatures, not Congress, set out the laws of divorce, parentage, adoption, and child custody.172 Where the federal government does act, it does
so interstitially, by, for example, regulating family law in territories that have
not yet become states,173 choosing which marriages to recognize for federal
purposes,174 using state family law as a basis for federal benefits,175 and—
critically, for our purposes—conditioning federal funding on the adoption of
particular state family law rules.176
DNA testing opened up new possibilities in state family law. Traditionally, it was birth or marriage—not genes—that led to legal parentage. A
mother who gave birth to a child was its legal mother; a father who was married to a woman who gave birth was the child’s legal father. As Justice Scalia
famously put it in Michael H. v. Gerald D., it was this “unitary family,” husband,
wife, and genetic child of the wife, that was given “historic respect—indeed,
sanctity would not be too strong a term.”177 These presumptions developed
in part because of the impossibility of demonstrating genetic parentage in
the era before blood typing and DNA testing. They were also a response to
the stigma of illegitimacy, a concern that children might become “wards of
the state,” and an interest in promoting stable marriages and families.178
Over time, state family law has evolved from this fairly simple paradigm
to a more complex system in which a variety of adults are potential legal
parents to children. The law’s embrace of adoption was a first step toward
the recognition of parents beyond the “unitary family,” and now many other
possibilities exist.179 The legal parent of a child might be the genetic parent,
but not if the genetic parent is classified as a sperm donor or egg donor.180
The legal parent might be the birth mother, but not if she is classified as a
171 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693–701 (1992) (describing family law
exception to federal diversity jurisdiction); Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 172–73 (2009).
172 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (“The whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States.” (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593–94 (1890))).
173 See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (repealed 1910) (outlawing polygamy in
the territories).
174 See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996),
invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
175 Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467,
1483–1510 (2013).
176 Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 272–73
(2000).
177 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion).
178 Id. at 124–25.
179 See generally Sarah Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 37 (2009) (discussing the evolution of English and American adoption and psychological parent theories).
180 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a
Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 479–80 (2013).
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gestational surrogate.181 The legal parent might be the birth mother’s husband, but not if the marital presumption of paternity is rebutted.182 Under
doctrines of de facto parenthood183 and second parent adoption,184 a legal
parent might be an unrelated adult who has been in a relationship with
another legal parent.
The traditional marital presumption of paternity recognized implicitly
that it can be better for a child to have a stable relationship with a father,
even if that father is likely not the child’s genetic parent. Likewise, new doctrines such as de facto parenthood and second-parent adoption recognize
that a non-genetic parent can establish such an enduring and substantial psychological bond with a child that it creates a parent-child relationship worthy
of legal protection in the form of custody, visitation, or legal parenthood.
On the other hand, doctrines such as parenthood by estoppel recognize a
child’s right to a continuing relationship with a non-genetic parent, even if
the parent wants the legal relationship severed.185 For instance, the Uniform
Parentage Act, the 2002 version of which has been adopted by nine states,186
provides that genetic testing requests may be denied if the father has already
been acknowledged if “conduct of the mother or the presumed or acknowledged father estops that party from denying parentage” and if it would be
“inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship.”187 The Act recommends judges look to factors including time that has passed since the father
was “placed on notice that he might not be the genetic father,” the manner
in which he discovered he might not be the genetic father, the time during
which he “has assumed the role of father,” the age of the child, and the
“nature of the relationship” with the child.188
State family law, in short, is interested in much more than identifying
DNA matches between parents and children; it is also interested in promoting the best interests of children, which may sometimes be furthered by fostering relationships with non-genetic relatives who are functioning in a
parenting role. DNA provided an additional tool for states to use in establishing parent-child relationships, but the specific role DNA should play in
individual family law cases is far from clear.

181 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
182 See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959
(R.I. 2000).
183 See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008).
184 See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
185 Glover v. Severino, 946 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008); UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
§ 608(a) (2002); see also Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 903 n.7 (Md. 1993) (describing
a different doctrine of “equitabl[e] estopp[el]”).
186 David M. Wagner, Thomas v. Scalia on the Constitutional Rights of Parents: Privileges and
Immunities, or Just “Spinach”?, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 49, 69 n.114 (2011).
187 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 608(a)(1)–(2).
188 Id. §§ 608(b)(1)–(5).
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2. Federal Statutes, Child Support, and DNA Testing
When states had the opportunity to decide what role newly available
DNA testing should play in parentage determinations, the federal government intervened, in an example of what we would term data-driven regulation of identification testing. Congress responded to the promise of DNA
testing through a series of acts that increasingly conditioned states’ receipt of
welfare funds on the identification of genetic fathers.189
The final and most famous of these acts, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) replaced the former welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), with a new
program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).190 Where the
goal of AFDC had been to supplement income of families (largely headed by
single mothers) when children were in need, the aim of TANF, as expressed
in its name, was to temporarily supplement income while simultaneously
encouraging them to work or obtain other means of income by marriage to a
breadwinner.191 The logic was simple: if a child had an available father, then
he, not the government, should be supporting the child.
This message was particularly appealing in the mid-1990s, when the
media launched an attack on “deadbeat” dads that was embraced by feminist
activists, religious conservatives, and politicians of all stripes.192 Certainly,
Congress’s goal was a legitimate one; there really were many fathers who were
capable of paying child support and yet evaded the authorities. Over time,
however, many early proponents of these laws began to notice that they were
often counterproductive. They turned their attention from “deadbeat dads”
to focus instead on “dead broke” dads, or as some put it, “turnips” (as in, the
kind of vegetable you can’t get blood from, or the kind of father you can’t
get cash from—because there isn’t any).193
But Congress’s approach was not to merely identify a genetic father and
make him, and only him (along with the child’s genetic mother), responsible
for the child. Instead, Congress set up a complex legal web intended to
189 Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, pt. B, § 101(a), 88 Stat.
2337, 2351 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–60 (2012)); Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 26, and
42 U.S.C.) (providing federal funding to largely cover the costs of genetic testing); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13721, 107 Stat. 312, 658–60;
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112–61.
190 See 42 U.S.C. § 601.
191 For a discussion of federal marriage promotion efforts following TANF, see Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of PostBellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1673–82 (2005).
192 See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 350 (2005).
193 Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income
Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 633 (2012) (quoting
Ronald B. Mincy & Elaine J. Sorensen, Deadbeats and Turnips in Child Support Reform, 17 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 44, 44–45 (1998)).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl206.txt

794

unknown

Seq: 38

notre dame law review

29-JAN-16

15:54

[vol. 91:2

ensnare fathers using a variety of means, sometimes through a DNA test, but
more commonly by inducing fathers to voluntarily admit paternity without a
DNA test, or under threat of one. This regulatory scheme allowed Congress
to identify fathers for many children, but it had some perverse effects.194
a. Indemnification Actions
The most important use of DNA testing in the new federal scheme was a
requirement that unmarried mothers receiving public aid cooperate “in
good faith” to establish the identity of the genetic father and secure his legal
paternity of the child.195 This part of PRWORA requires a mother applying
for welfare benefits to identify a putative father so that the state can file a
lawsuit against him for reimbursement of welfare through child support payments.196 The statute authorizes the use of DNA testing to determine
genetic paternity, although the vast majority of men sued in such cases voluntarily agree to admit to paternity without actually undergoing testing or are
identified as the parent through a default judgment.197
This requirement forces a mother to make a choice: forgo welfare or
enter into an adversarial relationship with the man she believes to be the
child’s father. As Jane Murphy has argued, “being forced into repeated court
appearances . . . undermines relationships.”198 The state’s case may include
a contempt action in which the father is threatened with incarceration and
“[t]he mother’s name on the case may make it look like she instigated the
case, though she actually has no control in the decision to begin a contempt
action and is often not informed about the action until she, too, receives a
summons.”199 Professor Murphy also notes that many men respond to a
child support action with a custody dispute of their own, a case in which the
state will offer the mother no assistance in defending her right to remain the
custodial parent of her child.200 Similarly, Daniel Hatcher has observed that
“[t]he potential for collaboration between low-income mothers and fathers
can be severely hampered by the forced child support and paternity requirements, and polarization can result.”201
The role of DNA in these cases is substantial even though few judges
actually order DNA tests. The threat of a finding of genetic parentage, protracted litigation, and incarceration for contempt is often enough to con194 Linda McClain has noted the irony of PRWORA’s embrace of “responsible fatherhood” while simultaneously requiring women with small children to work. LINDA C.
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY]
104–05 (2006).
195 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A).
196 Id.
197 Murphy, supra note 192, at 350.
198 Id. at 373.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 373–74.
201 Daniel L. Hatcher, Don’t Forget Dad: Addressing Women’s Poverty by Rethinking Forced
and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 775, 776 (2012).
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vince a man to concede paternity, whether he is certain of it or not.202 And
in those cases where the man defaults, a judgment may be entered against
him regardless of his genetic parentage. The law, then, assumes the primacy
of genetic parentage by making a mother identify the person she believes to
be her child’s genetic father, but it does not require actual testing if the
putative father’s compliance can be achieved by other means.203
Despite the high number of settled or uncontested cases, federal law
appears to have created a boom in genetic testing (and many parties may
take DNA tests outside the judicial process so that they enter the proceedings
already knowing the likely outcome of the case). The Child Support
Enforcement program results in millions of dollars spent on genetic testing.204 Mary Anderlik and Mark Rothstein argue that “the growth of a commercial identity testing industry has undoubtedly been spurred by federal
welfare policy.”205 Thus, in this particular instance, a law intended to regulate welfare recipients has profoundly affected the rate of genetic testing
among unmarried parents.
b. Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity
Paternity post-PWORA is sometimes determined through a judicial proceeding, but far more often, putative fathers simply execute a Voluntary
Acknowledgment of Paternity, or “VAP.” The vast majority of VAPs are
entered into at the hospital of birth.206 The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) calls the “happy hour” immediately following birth
“the most opportune time for paternity establishment.”207 A father deciding
whether or not to sign a VAP may seek DNA testing,208 but federal law precludes state courts from requiring it.209
202 Some fathers forgo testing because if paternity is established, they will be billed for
the costs of the test by the state. Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate
Gender, Status, and Class Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1319–20.
203 Cf. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 139 (2006) (noting that
“[m]assive resources are . . . devoted to identifying genetic fathers and establishing their
legal parentage”).
204 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, FY1998 ANNUAL REPORT—TABLE 25 (1998), http:/
/www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/fy1998-annual-report-table-25.
205 Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 1, at 217.
206 See NAT’L CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T ASS’N, QUICK FACTS: PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT
(2011), http://www.ncsea.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Paternity-EstablishmentQuick-Facts.pdf; OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, FY2010 PRELIMINARY REPORT (2011),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2011/reports/preliminary_report_fy2010/.
207 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., IN-HOSPITAL VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROGRAM: EFFECTIVE PRACTICES IN HOSPITAL STAFF TRAINING 1 (1997), http://
www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-95-00162.pdf.
208 NAT’L CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T ASS’N, supra note 206.
209 45 C.F.R. § 302.70(a)(5)(vii) (requiring states accepting federal welfare funding to
establish “procedures under which a voluntary acknowledgment must be recognized as a
basis for seeking a support order without requiring any further proceedings to establish
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Under federal law, a state receiving welfare monies must establish a “hospital-based program for the voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.”210
The continuing receipt of TANF funds is expressly conditioned on the success of these programs: states are required to achieve high rates of paternity
establishment, and VAPs are generally the cheapest way to accomplish this.
The VAP programs established by states have been widely used. In 2009,
for example, 1,810,000 children were born outside marriage and paternity
was established by a VAP for 1,167,000 children.211 Once a VAP has been
signed, it can be rescinded for sixty days; after that, federal law requires that
it can be undone “only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger.”212
Like the indemnification lawsuits, then, VAPs can lead to legal affirmations of paternity even where no genetic paternity exists. These can be very
difficult to undo. These judgments are a bit like guilty pleas in a criminal
case (recall how many states bar post-conviction DNA testing in cases in
which defendants pleaded guilty); the question of legal identity is resolved
through a contractual agreement, and near-conclusive finality attaches to
that agreement. Yet very few men seek genetic testing before signing a VAP.
One study found that “even when free genetic testing was offered to anyone
who requested it before signing a VAP, only a tiny fraction asked for the
test.”213 As Leslie Harris has observed, “Parents who establish paternity by
signing VAPs, like married parents, generally do not want to challenge the
integrity of their relationships by requesting genetic testing at the time of
birth.”214 This reluctance bears a striking resemblance to the low number of
fiancés who execute premarital agreements. Hope and trust can be undermined at such an early stage by a refusal to participate in whatever procedure
has been designated as the norm.215
paternity”). This regulation and 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(5)(D)-(E) have been interpreted by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Child Support Enforcement
as precluding state courts from requiring genetic testing before accepting a VAP in a child
support case. See Paternity Disestablishment, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T (Apr. 28, 2003),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/paternity-disestablishment.
210 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii).
211 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, FY2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2009),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/fy2009-annual-report.
212 Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity Laws: Securing More Fathers at Birth for the
Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 67 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(5)(D)(iii)).
213 Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 477 (2012) (“Of the 1,660 nonmarital births examined, a
VAP was signed in seventy-eight and a half percent, and only in 112 cases was a genetic test
requested.”).
214 Id. at 477–78.
215 PRWORA and the other welfare acts expressly allow states to foreclose disestablishment of paternity for husbands. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(G). Instead, a state may create a
“conclusive presumption of paternity upon genetic testing results indicating a threshold
probability that the alleged father is the father of the child.” Id. This exception aligns with
the federal interest in privatizing children’s dependency. If a state is willing to lock marital
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3. The Perils of Data-Driven Identification
In the family law area, then, DNA testing has been used selectively to
further Congress’s own goals of recouping welfare costs and preventing overreliance on federal funds. This mode of regulation has enshrined in the law
a particular vision of the importance and role of genetic relationships that
was not inevitable and may not even be desirable. Because of the federal
mandate, states have been required to establish legal paternity early—even
where a non-genetic father is identified as the father—rather than identifying a genetic father early or waiting until an appropriate functional father
emerges. States have also been required to expend resources to seek recoupment of federal welfare dollars from parents who likely cannot pay. And federal law has also put citizens of states at increased risk of domestic violence
and privacy invasion in the name of federal fiscal goals.
a. Parentage
Federal welfare law has imposed a particular vision of the link between
genetic identity and parentage rights onto states that they might not otherwise have chosen. Had Congress not exercised its federal muscle, states quite
likely would have developed different approaches to establishing parentage
than they currently do, perhaps focusing far less on genetic identity. We can
see some hints of these likely differences in the variety of approaches states
have taken in retaining or abandoning the marital presumption.216 Without
any requirement that states attempt to identify the genetic father of every
child receiving welfare, and the requirement that all unmarried parents of
children be encouraged to execute VAPs, states’ recognition of marital,
genetic, and functional parents would likely have varied even more than
under the current scheme. Although the various possibilities are abundant,
there are a few worth exploring further.
First, states might have retained the marital presumption.217 The
administrative costs of genetic testing and paternity hearings are high.218
Some states might have attempted to reduce the number of these cases,
fathers into legal parenthood regardless of the results of genetic tests, then identifying the
genetic father is unnecessary. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not
John Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgements at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 58
(2010) (“In recognizing that states may foreclose paternity disestablishments by husbands
whose wives bear children from extramarital sex, federal law defers to state law on
paternity.”).
216 For a deeper analysis of the differences among states, see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent
Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629 (2014).
217 See generally Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the
Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246 (2006).
218 For statistics on the number of paternity cases in family courts, see Divorce Drives
Domestic Relations Caseloads, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/
Domestic-Relations/20124Domestic.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (showing paternity
cases reaching up to twenty percent of the total docket in some family courts), and D.C.
COURTS, STATISTICAL SUMMARY 4 (2014), http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/
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either by relying more extensively on marital presumptions or by refusing to
tie genetic paternity, standing alone, to child support and instead waiting for
fathers or mothers to initiate suits on their own.
Alternatively, some states might have developed more expansive de facto
parenthood doctrines that test a father’s functional relationship with a given
child rather than his genetic link. Jane C. Murphy has argued that the
“threat of DNA testing on demand destabilizes the relationships between parents as well as those between father and child and undermines all existing
policies favoring fathers’ continued involvement in children’s lives.”219 Similarly, Leslie Harris has urged courts and legislatures to adopt a system “that
recognizes the importance of biology while leaving room for protection of
functional parent-child relationships.”220 Other scholars have gone further,
arguing that genetic identity and parenting should be delinked. For example, Melanie Jacobs contends that sex-based parentage should move towards
an intent-based model, closer to how most states treat assisted reproductive
technologies (ART). Demanding that genetic fathers who conceive through
sexual intercourse but have no intent to parent become legal parents, she
argues, violates their equal protection rights.221 And Nancy Dowd has
argued that legal fatherhood should depend on “acts of nurturing” rather
than genetics, marital presumptions, or economic responsibilities.222
Finally, some states might have embraced DNA testing more wholeheartedly than PRWORA did. Rather than using DNA, the marital presumption,
and VAPs as alternative but equally binding means of locking men into legal
paternity, states might have decided that genetic identity is important
enough to establish early on in life and encouraged or required all children
to be tested. This approach has been advocated by family law scholars June
Carbone and Naomi Cahn, who note that because of the widespread availability of DNA testing, children are likely to eventually “discover the truth of
their biological origins whether all of the concerned adults wish it or not.”223
2014-Statistical-Summary-FINAL-02-12-15.pdf (suggesting that in some years, up to thirtyfive percent of family court cases are paternity cases).
219 Murphy, supra note 192, at 368–69.
220 Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child
Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 633–34 (2009).
221 Melanie B. Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood’s Influence: Rethinking Procreative Autonomy
and Federal Paternity Establishment Policy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 489, 507–08
(2012).
222 Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage, and Money to Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 132, 134 (2003).
223 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1012 (2003); see also
Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I. Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 42 (2003) (advocating required genetic testing at birth and stating
that “[i]n this area, an ounce of prevention may well be worth a pound of cure”); cf.
Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 711 (2003) (developing a
model for parentage that begins with a baseline of a biological connection).
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They use social science evidence to show that the mother’s partner—regardless of whether he is a child’s genetic father—is the person most likely to act
as a functional father during a child’s early years, but a man who knows he is
a child’s genetic father—regardless of whether he is still involved in an intimate relationship with the mother—is more likely to continue to play a role
in the child’s life throughout the childhood and teenage years.224 The current scheme, where a VAP can bind a man to a child even without a genetic
connection, encourages the first type of parental care, but at the risk of a
rupture when a father eventually discovers (or decides to confront the fact)
that he is not the child’s genetic parent.225
In contrast, if children were automatically tested for a genetic relationship immediately after birth (and those results could be searched against a
large national DNA database of putative parents), some partners of birth
mothers might abandon both mother and child at birth, some might decide
to claim legal parentage knowing there is no genetic connection, and still
others might discover a genetic connection early on that would otherwise
have gone unknown.226 Given that any legal system will have to privilege one
form of parentage over the other, Carbone and Cahn advocate for the second option. Early genetic information, they argue, prevents disruption later
on, and would give partners of mothers who turn out not to be a child’s
genetic father the opportunity to legally bind themselves to the child, knowing full well no genetic relationship exists. Under this approach, states might
have developed something akin to VAPs, but they would have been used not
to obviate the need for genetic testing but to create legal ties where genetic
testing disproved a relationship.
We do not adopt any of these particular approaches here. Our point is
simply that Congress mandated a scheme of paternity adjudication that
focused not on the privacy interests of parents, best interests of children, or
relationship rights of both. Instead, Congress acted quickly to create a system that it thought would be likely to protect the federal fiscal goals, ignoring other factors. This hasty action not only stalled states’ own
experimentation with paternity adjudication systems, but also had unintended consequences for state courts systems.
b. Child Support Enforcement
There is ample data supporting the conclusion that the child support
collection efforts mandated by federal legislation are not cost-effective.
There are two main reasons for this: (1) the inability of fathers to pay and (2)
the expense of the adjudication.
The primary reason so many genetic fathers with children on welfare are
unable to pay child support is simple: like the mothers and children involved,
224
225
226

Carbone & Cahn, supra note 223, at 1023–39, 1066.
Id. at 1061–66.
Id. at 1066–70.
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they too are poor.227 In 2006 there were over $105 billion in unpaid child
support arrearages nationwide.228 In one HHS study, researchers discovered
that the obligors who owed over the most (with “high debtor” defined as
someone who owed more than $30,000 in arrears) were much more likely to
have no reported income or reported incomes of $10,000 a year or less.229
The same study estimated that in a ten-year period, less than half of the total
arrears would be collected because “so much of the arrears are owed by obligors with no or low reported income.”230
Child-care enforcement is also enormously expensive for states to
undergo. One study found that the average child support enforcement case
yielded $363 in welfare recovery but cost the state $354 in administrative
costs.231
In addition to economic efficiency, states might also have been concerned about the best interests of children and the effect legal proceedings
might have on already struggling families. As Daniel Hatcher has argued,
some mothers might not want to cooperate with PRWORA’s requirement of
identifying the child’s father because they desire positive relationships with
the fathers of their children.232 Fathers who are already giving in-kind or
informal support (child-care, say, or housing or supplies) may be of great
help to single mothers.233 In fact, the relationship between the genetic parents is likely to be an evolving one that is renegotiated on a daily basis, as is
the relationship between the genetic father and his child. A mother may
want to protect the father of her child from the state in order to protect
herself.234
Another effect of VAPs has been an increase in the amount of “paternity
fraud” litigation; men who sign VAPs frequently claim later on that they
signed only due to fraud, and they seek to have the VAPs rescinded in the
wake of a child support lawsuit.235 VAPs, coupled with paternity proceedings
in which an admission of paternity is treated as the equivalent of a DNA test,
227 David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-Support
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2594 (1995) (“Not surprisingly, a high proportion of the
poorest children in this country also have poor fathers.”).
228 ELAINE SORENSEN ET AL., URBAN INST., ASSESSING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN NINE
LARGE STATES AND THE NATION 1 (2007), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
75136/report.pdf.
229 Id. at 3.
230 Id. at 7.
231 Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of
Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1073–74 (2007).
232 Id. at 1045–46.
233 Id.
234 Hatcher notes that an HHS report indicates that, of mothers who refuse to cooperate with child support investigations, 94% indicate that they want to protect the father, and
88% indicate that they fear losing informal support. Id. at 1046 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., CLIENT COOPERATION WITH CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES TO IMPROVEMENT 6 (2000)).
235 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q.
219, 220 (2011).
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create a situation where many men claim paternity and either change their
minds when their relationships with the children’s mothers sour, or challenge paternity after discovering facts that lead them to believe they are not
the child’s genetic father. Family court dockets are now replete with “paternity disestablishment” cases, and the subject has recently been a favorite of
legal critics.236
Because of all of these factors, it seems quite likely that without federal
coercion, many states might have experimented with alternatives to tying the
genetic paternity of impoverished men to child support obligations. The fact
that many states, within the constraints of federal law, have attempted to
increase indigent men’s ability to seek exceptions from the child support
guidelines or interest accruing on their arrears is one indication that states
have an interest in lessening this burden.237
c. Domestic Violence
Congress’s hasty foray into paternity adjudication also has led to perverse consequences for parents in violent relationships. Paternity testing can
“serve as a trigger for marital violence and child abuse.”238 This abuse can
happen when a father is angry that a mother is attempting to create a legal
relationship between himself and her child because he resents being sued for
child support. Establishing paternity can also make survivors of domestic violence more vulnerable because of the legal parent-child relationship it creates between father and child. A mother seeking to have no contact with an
abuser will have a more difficult time succeeding if she also has to facilitate
visitation or joint custody with the father. Some fathers may seek custody or
visitation in order to continue harassing the mother. And some abusers may
“do things to harm children, even their own, as a means of continuing control over their wives or girlfriends.”239 PRWORA also weakened the prior
exception for domestic violence survivors, waiving child support cooperation
and work requirements to protect victims of domestic violence and instead
giving states more flexibility to design their own approaches.240
236 See, e.g., Mary R. Anderlik, Disestablishment Suits: What Hath Science Wrought?, 4 J. CTR.
FAMS. CHILD. & COURTS 3 (2003); Harris, supra note 202, at 1305–06; Caroline Rogus,
Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of Our Paternity Laws, 21 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 67 (2014).
237 See SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 228, at 10–12 (discussing various states’ attempts).
238 Zanita E. Fenton, Bastards! . . . . And the Welfare Plantation, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
9, 24 n.97 (citing Laura Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See that Judges May Miss: A
Unique Guide to Custody Decisions When Spouse Abuse Is Charged, 27 JUDGES J. 9, 11 (1988);
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1991)).
239 Fenton, supra note 238, at 25 n.97 (citing Judge Michael J. Voris, Civil Orders of
Protection: Do They Protect Children, the Tag-Along Victims of Domestic Violence?, 17 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 599, 606 (1991)).
240 For an overview, see Ruth A. Brandwein, Family Violence and Social Policy: Welfare
“Reform” and Beyond, in BATTERED WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM 147, 156–164
(Ruth A. Brandwein, ed., 1999); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Con-

FOR
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d. Privacy
The DNA test itself is an imposition on the physical privacy of mothers
and fathers whose children receive welfare.241 In addition, the requirement
that mothers provide a list of “all possible fathers” if the genetic father’s identity is unknown violates her sexual privacy, and this list can then be used to
order the collection of DNA samples from these men and other third parties,
including their children.242 The adversarial proceedings between mother
and father for indemnification of the state’s welfare payments as authorized
by PRWORA are often open to the public, and the parents may be “seated
apart as plaintiff and defendant and forced to divulge intimate details before
crowded courtrooms.”243 Once states have this identity information, in addition to phone numbers, dates of birth, addresses, and other information,
PRWORA gives them the authority to have their child support collection
agencies collect information from employers, financial institutions, and governmental agencies to withhold a payer’s income and seize their assets.244
All of this is carried out with no judicial review.245
Once these records are created, they, like DNA databases, can be mined
for other purposes. For example, federal officials have searched welfare and
public housing rolls to identify individuals with outstanding warrants.246
Absent federal coercion, some states might have more robustly protected privacy of their citizens through alternative procedures, although to be sure,
some might not. In addition, privacy might have been inadvertently protected; if no databases were created, federal agencies could not search them
for other purposes. Thus, Congress’s approach to paternity adjudication is a
prime example of how data-driven, identification-testing regulations can sideline a range of important ethical concerns.
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF

DNA TESTING

The path of DNA testing over the past three decades is not singleminded. As Rochelle Dreyfuss and Dorothy Nelkin observed in the early days
temporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 153–159 (2002)
(“[T]here is a tremendous variation among them where the domestic violence exemption
is concerned, and that only a very few states have developed adequate policies.”).
241 See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
1389, 1399 (2012) (noting, in addition to many other ways in which welfare law invades the
privacy of recipients, that welfare recipients must provide DNA if paternity is contested).
242 Smith, supra note 240, at 145–47, 147 n.103 (citing Kindra L. Gromelski, Note, You
Made Your Bed . . . Now You Are Going to Pay For It: An Analysis of the Effects Virginia’s
Mandatory Paternal Identification in AFDC Cases Will Have on the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 5 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 396 (1999)).
243 Hatcher, supra note 201, at 779.
244 See Smith, supra note 240, at 147.
245 See id.
246 See Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485,
509–10 (2013).
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of DNA, “given the cultural appeal of science, and particularly genetic
assumptions, as neutral information, the tendency is to apply these assumptions beyond the point of actual demonstration and beyond their relevance
to particular situations.”247 Yet we have not seen DNA testing and geneticbased approaches dominate in every area where such information could
potentially be useful. Instead, genetics has been used where politically powerful interests have demanded it, and genetics may even be underused where
there is little political will to demand it. In criminal law, DNA information
has been assembled in vast databanks but chiefly used to identify potential
culprits, with barriers to its use to exonerate convicts. Legislatures have prioritized database expansion over crime solving. In family law, richer genetic
information is tested but put to more limited uses, and in ways that raise
privacy concerns, particularly as to less privileged families, e.g., welfare recipients. While preexisting law and inertia may counter change, regulatory
incentives and high-profile cases have pushed legal change and the overturning of longstanding statutes and precedents—but selectively, and in some
areas and not others.
The typology introduced in Part I and explored in context in Part II
produces two steps for analysis of genetics legislation. First, we argue that
one must ask whether that purpose is predictive or for purposes of identity.
Second, one should examine whether the statute, rule, policy, or judicial ruling represents a data-driven or ethics-based approach. Following that framework, we have shown a pervasive tension between data-driven and ethicsbased legislation. Ethics-based legislation emerges most commonly when legislators and courts consider predictive testing. The Maryland v. King decision, for example, dismissed privacy concerns with taking DNA from
arrestees for serious crimes but noted that the analysis might be different had
predictive uses of DNA been possible. Data-driven legislation has had an
unfortunate tendency to lead to perverse unintended consequences. The
approaches legislatures take to identification testing now have the potential
to become the approach for predictive testing in the future.
How can a focus on ethics-based considerations improve the quality of
genetic regulation? That is the subject to which we turn here in Part III. And
to be sure, the ethics-based approach, exemplified in the passage of GINA,
has its faults. In many instances, legislators focus on ethics when they see the
possibility of their own rights being impinged upon, and they may do so even
when there is little chance that such transgressions will actually occur. As
with data-driven legislation, ethics-based legislation is sometimes passed for
immediate political ends. Consider, for example, legislation banning genetic
cloning or Sharia law; legislators were attacking politically unpopular groups
for “ethical” reasons to score political points, not to tackle an imminent legal
problem. Thus, by “ethics-based,” we do not mean simply some normative
justification for a piece of legislation.

247

Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 1, at 348.
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Instead, our call for an ethics-based approach is for a careful balancing
of the interests at stake, with attention to the potential long-term consequences of lawmakers’ actions. This care is particularly important with a new
technology such as DNA testing because early action will likely set a path for
years to come. In this Part, we analyze five factors that should inform consideration of legislation on DNA testing: (1) equality, (2) accuracy, (3) privacy,
(4) finality, and (5) federalism.
A. Equality
Equality concerns, whether the treatment of the disabled, of minorities
targeted by police, or of welfare recipients, permeate the short history of
DNA regulation. Vulnerable populations, the indigent, and racial minorities,
or classes of people with fewer privacy rights like arrestees or welfare recipients, have been disproportionately asked to give up their genetic material to
the government. DNA legislation has developed in a checkered fashion. For
elites, paternity is determined by a broad set of considerations, while for indigent families, welfare is conditioned by pressure to acknowledge paternity
immediately or be subject to DNA testing. Elites are unlikely to think of
themselves as likely to be arrested for a crime they did not commit based on a
DNA match in a databank, or accused of paternity by a welfare agency seeking reimbursement. They are, however, likely to see themselves as potential
victims of genetic discrimination by employers or health insurance companies. Accordingly, their genetic privacy is protected, while the disadvantaged
are put in databases.
At the extreme, some have responded to these equality concerns by
arguing in favor of a universal DNA databank.248 Such a database would
obviate equal protection concerns; everyone’s genetic information could be
accessed. Everyone’s privacy would be equally invaded. Or would it? Whose
DNA would most often be searched in such a database? The federal government has not gone that far—although since as many as one third of Americans have been arrested by age twenty-three for non-traffic offenses249 and
the Supreme Court has now placed its imprimatur on DNA collection from
arrestees, the DNA databank may become very large. That said, so long as
minorities remain disproportionately subject to arrest as well as conviction, it
is minorities that are most likely to be included in DNA databanks. Welfare
recipients are most likely to be encouraged to use hospital bed paternity
acknowledgements or DNA tests (but they may not be able to get federal
benefits using a DNA test).
To add to that list of less privileged groups subject to intrusive DNA
collection, juvenile offenders, as Kevin Lapp has described in detail, are sub248 David Seifman, Getting DNA Samples at Birth Fine with Rudy, N.Y. POST, Dec. 17, 1998,
at 34; see supra text accompanying note 166.
249 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1988 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Robert Brame
et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21
(2012)).
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ject to mandatory DNA collection by the federal government, and in every
state but Hawaii. The statutes seek to add their information to databases to
“ ‘advance’ and ‘further’ the deterrent and rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
court.”250 The federal statute requires DNA collection from all individuals,
including juveniles, who are arrested (and/or later convicted) for any federal
offense.251 As Lapp describes, many of the states permit DNA collection
from juveniles for misdemeanor delinquency findings.252 Courts have
found, when juvenile DNA collection has been challenged, that these statutes
help to provide for “a juvenile offender’s needs for care and treatment, consistent with the prevention of delinquency,” and have a “deterrent and rehabilitative effect.”253 How DNA database collection helps rehabilitate
juveniles remains unstated in those judicial rulings.
In contrast, more privileged members of the population do not face the
prospect of intrusive genetic collection. Employees are federally protected
against genetic discrimination in the workplace, including as against future
developments in the technology that remain beyond the horizon. Less politically powerful groups may have great difficulty mounting privacy challenges—while more politically powerful groups may have their genetic
privacy protected and more.
The appeal of new forms of data collection may be particularly great
where less politically powerful groups shoulder the privacy burden. Groups
like arrestees, convicts, juveniles, noncitizens, parolees, and welfare recipients have traditionally been subject to more intrusive government monitoring and tracking.254 Those power dynamics help to explain why the same
federal funding that creates DNA databanks provides very little in the way of
funding to encourage DNA tests used in a post-conviction setting to potentially free the innocent. While genetics is not having one consistent type of
impact across these diverse areas, that is precisely the point. Political interests in particular, but also the litigation landscape and constitutional law,
have each defined different roles for genetic testing in each area.
250 Kevin Lapp, Compulsory DNA Collection and a Juvenile’s Best Interest, 14 U. MD. L.J.
RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 50, 51 (2014) (quoting In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570,
579 (Ill. 2008); In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action Nos. JV-512600 & JV-512797,
930 P.2d 496, 501–02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)).
251 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2010).
252 Lapp, supra note 250, at 57.
253 In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d at 581; In re S.M.L., 705 N.W.2d 906, *4 (Wis. Ct. App.
2005); Lapp, supra note 250, at 62 (analyzing the reasoning of these and other judicial
decisions).
254 On the ubiquity of law enforcement exemptions from privacy requirements in federal statutes, see Murphy, supra note 246, at 485; on conditional welfare receipt on providing personal information or consenting to inspections, see id. at 510. Similar arguments
have been made about invasive welfare drug tests; a Florida law was found to result in high
costs and few users caught. Lizette Alvarez, No Savings Are Found from Welfare Drug Tests,
N.Y. TIMES (April 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/us/no-savings-foundin-florida-welfare-drug-tests.html.
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B. Accuracy
The value of accuracy depends on what use that evidence is being put to
in litigation. Identity does not always matter in a case. Sometimes the issue is
conceded. In fact, it is usually conceded in criminal cases through a guilty
plea. DNA tests are most useful in sexual assault cases, because semen evidence can be isolated in the laboratory for DNA tests—but even in that area,
the vast majority of sexual assault cases involve acquaintances in which there
is no dispute about the identity of the rapist, but rather the question is
whether there was consent or not. Despite the limited relevance of identity
in most criminal cases, the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King emphasized
the importance of law enforcement’s ability to obtain DNA from arrestees for
purposes of “identification” during routine booking procedures. DNA may
not provide useful information if law enforcement already knows the person’s name (police can ask for identification, take a mugshot, and take fingerprints). What DNA provides is “identification” in the sense that police
can use the genetic information to search unsolved cold cases. Where identity matters and a DNA test can answer the relevant question, there is the
question of how reliably the forensic technique is used. DNA testing is far
more reliable than traditional forensics still commonly used in criminal cases,
and it has a sound statistical basis. As noted, though, there have been errors
in DNA tests, and erroneous statistics used. Novel new forms of DNA testing
continue to raise questions about the reliability of tests and their use in criminal matters.255
Accuracy and identity are less relevant in family law cases. While there
may be more instances than we might think where a person thinks they are a
genetic parent and are actually not, what matters to the child may chiefly be
the relationship and not the genetics. And if we do not want employers discriminating, even based on accurate genetic information about employees,
because we think employers should serve a role in ensuring the health of
employees, then accuracy and genetic identity may not be relevant at all in
the employment context. When getting genetic identity “right” matters is
entirely a normative question, but it has powerfully impacted statutes and
interpretation of constitutional rights.
C. Privacy
Across a host of areas, governments local, state, and federal have interests in collecting data about individuals, and in turn, those efforts increasingly raise complex privacy questions, both statutory and constitutional in
nature. The federal government has the greatest resources to do so and the
greatest interest in tracking individuals across state lines and solving coordination problems that might make it hard for any locality to effectively gather
255 See, e.g., People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564, 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (finding inadmissible as not generally accepted low copy or “high sensitivity” DNA testing technique
used by medical examiner in criminal case). But see People v. Megnath, 898 N.Y.S.2d 408,
413 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (finding low copy DNA testing admissible).
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data. Erin Murphy describes “perhaps the watershed moment of government
databasing”: when J. Edgar Hoover created the FBI crime lab (a moment
dramatized in Clint Eastwood’s 2011 film J. Edgar) and the FBI subsequently
created its first fingerprint database, “a card sorter that capitalized on the
technology created to tabulate the census and that led to the formation of
IBM.”256 From those humble origins in 1924, when the FBI first began
assembling a national collection of fingerprints, the FBI has now developed
“the largest criminal fingerprint database in the world”: the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), a system of fingerprint
databases, interconnected with state databases much like the DNA databank
and with more than one hundred million sets of prints.257
More recently, the FBI has linked federal and state systems of maintaining criminal records, creating the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) in 1983, providing grants to upgrade criminal information records,
and as part of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, creating a
National Instant Criminal Background Check System.258 James Jacobs and
Tamara Crepet describe how the FBI continues to push for expanded data
collection, seeking, for example, adding arrest information, juvenile offenses,
and misdemeanor offenses to the NCIC records keeping system.259 Similarly,
in 2006 Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act,
which denies federal funding to states that fail to create and maintain sex
offender registries that comply with federal guidelines, and authorizes the
FBI to create a combined national registry, the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA).260 All of this fits well with the federal focus
in the DNA context on ever-expanding collection of DNA information and
encouraging states and localities to supply more and more genetic data to
the federal system.
A universal DNA databank would potentially allow the state to access
genetic information for all sorts of purposes, and not just through databanks
used to locate culprits of crimes, but perhaps also those used to identify putative parents or family members of non-citizen detainees, or those used for
other purposes. Perhaps there could be a convergence, in which the criminal databanks would be used for family law and welfare law matters, or immigration matters, or national security matters. Interoperability of genetic
databanks would raise a host of privacy concerns. Applying for welfare might
256 Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 803, 805–06 (2010); J. EDGAR (Warner Brothers, 2011).
257 See Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (“IAFIS is the
largest criminal fingerprint database in the world, housing the fingerprints and criminal
histories for more than 70 million subjects in the criminal master file, along with more
than 34 million civil prints.”).
258 James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal
Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 180–82 (2008).
259 Id. at 187–90.
260 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
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make one’s family and partners’ genetic information available to law enforcement, or an arrest might make one’s genetic information available to a family
court, and the separate procedural and constitutional rules in place to regulate each area would fall by the wayside. Convergence would make for bigger
data but with troubling implications.
Nor is the privacy concern with convergence an idle one, given a federal
push to collect more biometric information in interconnected databases.
Since September 11, the federal government has gone far beyond maintaining social security records, tax records, criminal records, banking records,261
and the like, and has invested in remarkable data-mining efforts creating vast
collections of data from public sources and some private ones as well, such as
the effort by the National Security Agency to monitor telecommunications in
the United States.262 DNA databanks may pale in comparison to the size and
sophistication of other federal data collection efforts now underway. They
may arise from the same urge, however, where states would lack the resources
and collective will to create a unified system. Moreover, since September 11,
Congress has proposed new biometric “identity management” tolls, such as
“cardless” verification relying on DNA, iris scans, or fingerprints.263
Mass DNA screening is not completely farfetched, and the federal government would likely be the driving force behind it. In contrast, states can
balance the need to invest in data collection as against all of its other law
enforcement priorities (like crime prevention, rehabilitation, incarceration,
etc.). The federal government has less need to engage in careful cost-benefit
analysis. At the same time, the federal government may sometimes depend
on states and local government, as well as third-party providers, to obtain the
raw data that it depends on, and in turn, any information generated through
these databases may be relied upon by state and local government, employers, and other third parties.
D. Finality
One might not think of rules of finality as raising ethical considerations,
but they do reflect a decision that legal judgment should at some point not
be reopened. Willingness to reopen legal judgments reflects an ethical view
that accuracy or fairness should permit a second or successive look at
whether that judgment should still be adhered to. In a range of areas, traditional rules of finality have been relaxed to permit DNA testing, whether it is
statutes of limitations that limit prosecutors, rules on introducing new evidence of innocence helpful to prisoners post-conviction, or tolling rules for
contesting paternity.264 Yet the priority on finality changes depending on
261 See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2012); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (2001).
262 Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 435, 436 (2008).
263 Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1483, 1487 (2013).
264 See Jackson v. Newsome, 758 N.E.2d 342, 351–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
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underlying values. Courts have cited to the value of “finality” when denying
requests for post-conviction DNA testing.265
Finality also has great weight in the family law context, where the concern is with disrupting relationships and attachments between a child and
parents, and therefore the priority is placed on establishing paternity at birth
using a VAP or genetic testing. Yet not only is DNA testing now used for
paternity testing, but finality has been somewhat relaxed in jurisdictions
where paternity laws have changed, permitting use of DNA to rebut the presumption that the husband is the father.266 A wrongful conviction has similarly irreversible consequences; one would think that a deprivation of liberty
would deserve the relatively inexpensive step of releasing genetic evidence
for DNA testing. Of course, a DNA exoneration of a convict shows that law
enforcement, the judge, jurors, and lawyers all made a grave error. The
Court’s criminal law rulings suggest that accuracy matters far more when it
helps law enforcement convict the guilty than when it helps to free the innocent. Finality is not valued in the same way for those whose DNA is in a
databank and may face potential identification and use of the DNA in
perpetuity, even if the person was arrested but not charged or is acquitted.267
In contrast, a DNA test may help (or not) the court to adjudicate a child
custody or child support dispute—but the results do not implicate any failures by the state.
E. Federalism
A federalism-related concern that may be unique to the DNA context is
the linking of multiple databases under one national government and the
potential for abuse that linkage creates. Governments collect some data for
particular purposes but then may be tempted to use it for others. Sometimes, Congress has been thoughtful about the potential for abuse (think, for
instance, of HIPAA, which prevents the use of medical data for other purposes), but in other instances, especially where law enforcement concerns
are paramount, it is tempting to allow free-ranging use of information once it
is obtained. Thus, we could see welfare databases trolled for names of criminal suspects. One advantage of a state-by-state system is its cumbersome
nature; it is simply more difficult for the states to cooperate to become “big
brother” than it is for the federal government to take on that role. The consequences of allowing one government are especially dire with biomedical
information. Nationwide databanks provide a much more dangerous form
of government oversight, vulnerable to hackers and those who would abuse
power, than a diffuse set of state and local databanks.
265 See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375–76 (4th Cir. 2002).
266 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 32:2–4 (2010).
267 On the difficulty in having one’s DNA expunged, see Elizabeth E. Joh, The Myth of
Arrestee DNA Expungement, U. A L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2015).
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On the other hand, states may resist federal requirements in ways that
may be unintentionally harmful to privacy or policy, or just haphazard. Lax
federal oversight of its spending is by no means unique to the DNA testing
context. CODIS has had slow, uneven growth (states widely vary in how many
DNA profiles they submit) and compliance. Similarly, as of a July 2011 deadline, the 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act had only fourteen
states in substantial compliance with its requirements to create new sex
offender databases.268 One can imagine all sorts of reasons why compliance
might be slow. Even with federal grant assistance, creating a new offender
database may be expensive. It may be politically unpopular; the public may
oppose creating new consequences for convictions or may fear doing so
could undermine rehabilitation. States may view their existing offender
registries as adequate. Further, states may know that the federal threat of
withdrawing funding lacks teeth; the DOJ press release announcing lack of
compliance even noted that the statute permits only a ten percent reduction
of funding under a particular grant program—and that money can be
returned should the state represent that it will use the money to implement
the Act’s requirements.269
None of these concerns means that Congress should not participate in
criminal, family, or employment law, much less promote uses of genetic evidence in a given area of law. Nor do they preclude Congress from engaging
in the regulation of genetics, whether intentional or incidental. However,
they do highlight some of the problems with congressional action in this
area. Some of these are the usual justifications for federalism and could
apply equally to other areas of congressional intervention. Some, however—
the privacy concern in particular—are especially important in the context of
DNA evidence. The states have resisted federal efforts in criminal law and
family law in certain respects, and sometimes those interventions have
blunted poor policy choices made by Congress. As Chief Justice John Roberts recently put it, “The States are separate and independent sovereigns.
Sometimes they have to act like it.”270
268 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Finds 24 Jurisdictions Have
Substantially Implemented SORNA Requirements (July 28, 2011), http://ojp.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2011/SMART_PR-072811.htm.
269 Id. at 2 (“The Act also permits states and territories to potentially recoup the 10
percent reduction in a future fiscal year if they demonstrate these funds will be used to
implement SORNA programs.”). Take another example: in the wake of the Virginia Tech
shootings, Congress enacted the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 to require
states to collect data on individuals with mental illness and report them to the Attorney
General. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–180, 121 Stat.
2559 (2008). Although grants were provided to create electronic systems to collect the
data, and states not in compliance could lose their federal funds under the Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, nevertheless, “[t]he deadline to comply with the NICS
Improvement Amendments Act has come and gone, and in spite of the threat of losing
federal funds, not all states are complying.” Jana R. McCreary, Falling Between the Atkins
and Heller Cracks: Intellectual Disabilities and Firearms, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 271, 279 (2011).
270 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012).
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CONCLUSION
Have the United States Supreme Court and courts more generally overor under-constitutionalized genetics, exacerbating the larger problem of regulating genetics by focusing on data and not on ethics? The courts have
tended to remain on the sidelines or divided about the significance of modern genetic testing, in the face of legislation and increasing use of genetic
evidence. Far from embracing “genetic essentialism,” courts sometimes
remain wary of relying too heavily on genetic evidence across most of the
diverse contexts discussed. In family law, as in Michael H., perhaps this is a
good thing, since overreliance on genetic identity may unsettle healthy and
established family relationships. In contrast, finality of a legal arrangement is
not a good thing if it is an erroneous conviction, causing an innocent person
to remain in prison and the guilty to go free. We have criticized Osborne v.
District Attorney’s Association, in which the Court refused to recognize a due
process right to post-conviction DNA testing, out of concern with interfering
with state experimentation, despite the fact that nearly all states already provided DNA testing post-conviction—the Court was unwilling, in effect, to ratify a national consensus that DNA testing should be used to free innocent
convicts.
We have described how there is no uniform policy on regulation of
genetic testing any more than there is a uniform policy towards collection of
other forms of personal information or use of other types of evidence across
quite different types of litigation. In each area, whether genetic evidence
makes a decision more “accurate” depends on what use we have for that data.
One should not uncritically accept that a DNA test is either relevant or irrelevant, but should instead ask what purposes are served by attaching legal consequences to genetic identity. First, we suggest that one must ask whether
that purpose is predictive or for purposes of identity. Second, one should
examine whether the statute, rule, policy, or judicial ruling uses a data-driven
and ethics-based approach.
Only by unpacking the precise interests at stake can one then assess
whether there is a concern with the adequacy of the state’s justification for
regulating and collecting genetic evidence and whether the affected persons
are legitimately burdened in their genetic privacy. In areas chiefly focusing
on data collection, whether intentionally as in criminal law or incidentally as
in family law, ethical concerns have been sidelined. A high-profile example
comes from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maryland v. King. As Justice Scalia
put it in his dissent, the majority in that case “disguises the vast (and scary)
scope of its holding,” rather than admit the implications of the broad police
power to collect DNA the Court recognized in King.271 The Court emphasized, in response, that the genetic information was relevant only to “identity”
and not to predicting future conditions. However, similar reasoning can be
found in a host of lower court decisions approving DNA collection from
arrestees, convicts, juveniles, and others.
271

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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DNA has reshaped some aspects of the law, but its use should be more
closely tied to well thought out genetic policy, and not so heavily influenced
by the more data-driven (and quintessentially federal) interests, such as that
in tracking and screening individuals. Although genetics have not supplanted traditional legal analysis, they have occupied some fields but have
been neglected in others. Genetic evidence can provide an appearance of
scientific neutrality, in the mere collection of identifying information that
can disguise difficult ethical and policy choices.
Still more troubling are the potential predictive uses of the architecture
already in place as genetic technology continues to advance. As predictive
uses of genetic information become more powerful, the regulatory discussion
will likely change from data-driven uses of genetics to a broader ethics-based
discussion that has been lacking in areas like criminal and family law. Sooner
or later we will have technology for near-instant DNA analysis. A universal
DNA database or a government-required use of DNA as a method of personal
identification are no longer farfetched. Collection of genetic information
for criminal purposes, family and welfare law purposes, or medical and
employment purposes would then be very difficult to separate, if the information were to be housed in the same databases.
The disparate paths that genetic testing has taken in each legal context
then start to look preferable to that uniform alternative. There may be pressures to interconnect genetic information through databases, yet in the
future we may be able to generate far more information from DNA tests
about a person, their appearance, their medical history and predispositions,
their family, and more. Interconnected databases may be far more susceptible to hacking. The Supreme Court in King merely noted “additional privacy
concerns” should a “predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity,” be possible through DNA analysis by
police.272 Family searching of DNA to solve crimes may become more common, but if databases became interconnected, there would be the potential
to locate parents to pay child support or to predict medical conditions or
even violent predispositions. Routine DNA testing to screen for diseases and
other medical conditions may become inexpensive and commonplace, while
at present, genetic testing and counseling is not generally routine and it can
be expensive. Each of those additional ethical and privacy concerns will be
raised in the near future. And when that comes to pass, the government’s
role in regulating DNA collection and use should not be accepted uncritically, whether it is incidental or intentional.
Genetic research and technology have reshaped our legal system in
unforeseen ways and will continue to do so. Genetic information is not just a
subject of law and regulation, but it can in turn shape regulation and the law.
Genetics regulation has been a driving force as DNA testing has become a
fact of everyday life, and as a result, across very different areas of the law we
see new data-driven policy at the expense of constitutional rights and ethical
272

Id. at 1979.
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concerns. The types of interest-based scrutiny that we develop, by setting out
the competing individual and government interests at stake in genetic regulation, should form the basis for more rigorous analysis. Indeed, not only
could they provide for deeper analysis under existing constitutional rights,
such as the Fourth Amendment or due process, but they could form the basis
for a freestanding right to genetic privacy, of the type recognized in other
related areas, such as fundamental rights regarding family decisions and
reproduction and due process rights concerning privacy and bodily
integrity.273
The thrust of this Article has been to unpack how seemingly disparate
areas of law raise analogous questions regarding the legitimacy and degree of
state interests in genetic evidence and the degree of imposition on individual
genetic privacy. These are not separate problems to be relegated to their
traditional doctrinal “pigeonholes” but a unified problem of poorly conceived and deferentially reviewed regulation of genetic identity, raising the
concern, as John Hart Ely put it, that there are not adequate safeguards to
“ensure that decisions are being made democratically” and to “reduce the
likelihood that a different set of rules is effectively being applied to the comparatively powerless.”274
A story of unequal treatment emerges when comparing genetic regulation across legal fields. Groups such as arrestees, convicts, juveniles, noncitizens, and welfare recipients, who already receive less privacy protection,
have received the most intrusive regulation and collection of their genetic
evidence, while comparatively privileged persons obtain enhanced genetic
privacy. Whatever the mode of legal analysis, constitutional or statutory, regulatory or judicial, courts, commentators, and the public must be far more
vigilant in scrutinizing the “genetic panopticon”275 that will only grow in size
and in its uses in the years to come.

273 Developing such a constitutional theory raises questions beyond the scope of this
Article, but any such analysis would depend on the categories and interests identified here.
274 ELY, supra note 6, at 177.
275 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989.
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